Analysis and performance evaluation of coordinated transaction scheduling by Yurdakul, Ogun
c© 2018 Ogu¨n Yurdakul
ANALYSIS AND PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF COORDINATED
TRANSACTION SCHEDULING
BY
OGU¨N YURDAKUL
THESIS
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Science in Electrical and Computer Engineering
in the Graduate College of the
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2018
Urbana, Illinois
Adviser:
Professor Peter W. Sauer
ABSTRACT
In this thesis, we focus on coordinated transaction scheduling (CTS )—an
interchange evaluation methodology that is deployed by the New York Inde-
pendent System Operator (NY ISO) and Independent System Operator-New
England (ISO-NE) since December 15, 2015. The analysis and the quantifi-
cation of the performance of any interchange evaluation methodology require
the explicit representation of the physical aspects, the economic aspects, the
steps of the coordination procedure, and all the interactions among them. In
order to consider the required representation and tools in a unified structure,
we construct a framework. This framework is general and comprehensive,
and can be used as a consistent basis that allows the side-by-side comparison
of any two interchange evaluation methodologies.
We tailor this framework for CTS, and construct appropriate models of the
power system assets and the economics of the two interconnected IGOs, as
well as their interactions. We provide an analytical underpinning of the
procedural steps of CTS, all the while taking considerable care to maintain
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the unshared information confidentiality as the private information of each
IGO. We perform an assessment of the duration of each procedural step, and
identify the binding constraints in the analysis of shorter coordination peri-
ods. We use the actual real-time market prices at Sandy Pond and Roseton
busses, and evaluate the dependence of the interchange on the coordination
period duration. In order to illustrate the execution of the procedural steps
of CTS, we use various data sets, and we evaluate the interface exchange and
the total payments for each data set. We conduct sensitivity analyses, and
examine the dependence of the interface exchange and the total payments on
a change in the internal offers or the interface offers.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, we describe the nature of the problems considered in this thesis,
review the relevant literature and discuss the scope and the key contributions of the
thesis. We provide the nature of the problems discussed in this thesis in Section 1.1.
In Section 1.2, we review the state of the art and the progress to date on the solution
of these problems. We discuss in Section 1.3 the scope of the thesis, highlight the
key contributions, and provide a chapter-by-chapter outline of the contents of this
thesis.
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1.1 The Nature of the Problems Discussed in This
Thesis
The advent of power interchange between interconnected power systems brings about
a key need to understand the nature of the economic and physical aspects of each of
the interconnected power systems, as well as the coordination scheme that governs
the power interchange among interconnected power systems. The power system oper-
ations and wholesale purchase/sale of electricity in each individual power system are
administered by an independent entity. We refer to this independent entity by the
generic name independent grid operator (IGO) to encompass various organizations
such as independent system operator (ISO), transmission system operator (TSO),
regional transmission organization (RTO) and independent transmission provider
(ITP).
Power systems may be connected to each other via-tie lines, which allow the flow
of power among interconnected power systems. The interconnectivity of the power
systems engenders various opportunities for the IGOs of these systems, including
the coordination of their power system operations and wholesale purchase/sale of
electricity. An obvious goal for such a coordination is to meet the power demand
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with a lower total payment. After the resources in a system are used to clear the
demand in that system, additional available generation can be exported to other in-
terconnected systems via the utilization of the tie lines, as long as it is cheaper than
the generation in the importing system. The IGOs of the interconnected systems
need to coordinate with each other to perform such an interchange. Since IGOs
cannot take financial positions in electricity markets, they cannot buy/sell power
from/to each other. Hence, they need to harness market-based coordination schemes
for the determination of interchange evaluation. One such scheme is coordinated
transaction scheduling (CTS), which constitutes the focus of this thesis [1]. CTS
has been approved by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC ) for the
New York Independent System Operator (NY ISO) and the Independent System
Operator-New England (ISO-NE) in 2012, and has been in place for the determi-
nation of their interchange evaluation since December 15, 2015 [2], [3].
The execution of a coordination scheme requires the IGOs of the interconnected
systems to consider the power system operations and the wholesale purchase/sale
of electricity of each interconnected system, as well as the procedural steps of the
coordination scheme. However, an IGO is required to maintain the confidentiality
of certain data/information on its system. Such a requirement limits the data/infor-
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mation that is made available for the execution a coordination scheme. Regardless of
the particular choice of coordination scheme, the IGOs of the interconnected power
systems must agree on which data/information to share, and must maintain the con-
fidentiality of the unshared information as the private information of each IGO.
The execution of any coordination scheme involves many sources of uncertainty [4].
A coordination scheme is executed for a coordination period based on certain data/in-
formation that is collected at a time instant before the beginning of that coordination
period. The collected data/information for the execution of a coordination scheme
may include the demand, the generation of the resources, power flow data, status
of the tie-lines etc. However, the collected data/information may change during the
coordination period. For instance, the generators that were expected to be available
may not be available, the actual demand may be different than the forecasted de-
mand, or tie-lines can fail. Hence, we are interested in decreasing the coordination
period durations so as to capture the actual data/information better.
Such are the topics that we explicitly consider in this thesis. Before we delve into
these topics in detail, we first review the state of the art on the area in the next
section.
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1.2 Review of the State of the Art
In this section, we briefly review the coordination schemes that are deployed in the
actual power system operations, as well as the literature on coordination schemes.
The capability of transaction of power between interconnected systems may predate
the utilization of coordination schemes for interchange. A scheme that did not involve
the coordination of the IGOs and was frequently used was that an external market
participant that wished to transact power between two interconnected power sys-
tems would separately submit an offer to one IGO and a bid to the other IGO. The
external market participant would submit an offer/bid to the IGO from/to which
it wished to transact power. The submitted offer and bid were cleared separately
in the markets of the IGOs. If the offer price of the external market participant is
higher than the price of electricity in the system from which it wishes to transact
power, and the bid price of the external market participant is lower than the price of
electricity in the system to which it wishes to transact power, then the transaction of
power would clear. Such a scheme clearly lacked the coordination of the two IGOs,
and resulted in power flows from the system where the price of electricity was higher
to the system where the price of electricity is lower—which is contrary to the goal of
the utilization of interchange [1].
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In December 15, 2015, ISO-NE and NYISO started to use a coordinated scheme
called coordinated transaction scheduling (CTS)—which also constitutes the focus of
this thesis [3]. CTS involves an offer type called an interface offer which is submitted
simultaneously to both IGOs by an external market participant that wishes to trans-
act power across the interface [1]. The two IGOs use the submitted interface offers,
and share some of their data/information regarding submitted offers and demands
to determine the interchange evaluation. However, each IGO must also maintain the
confidentiality of data/information on its system, which limits the available data/in-
formation for the execution of CTS. The sharing of data/information between the
interconnected IGOs is considered in detail throughout the thesis.
Another scheme that is discussed in the industry is tie-line optimization (TLO) [1].
TLO assumes the hypothetical aggregation of two interconnected systems, and that
the hypothetically aggregated super-system is operated by an hypothetical super-
IGO that overtakes the functions of both IGOs and so has knowledge of the offers
and the demands of the two IGOs. Hence, TLO does not recognize either the
identities or the independence of the two interconnected IGOs. Therefore, the de-
termination of what used to be referred to as interchange via TLO is the same as
the determination of power flow on any transmission line of the super-system.
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Interchange evaluation has been discussed in the literature since the 1980s, mainly in
the form of a multi-area coordination problem[4], [5]. The solution to such problems
generally employs methods that decompose the joint optimal power flow problem,
and attain the optimal power flow by iteratively exchanging information. The pur-
pose of such solution methods is to drive the dispatch in each area toward the optimal
solution of the joint optimal power flow problems, hence attaining overall efficiency.
As briefly reviewed in [5], some of the methods involving primal decomposition meth-
ods are provided in [6] and [7], and examples of solution methods involving dual de-
composition methods can be found in [8] and [9]. However, such approaches do not
conform to the electricity market structure in North America, because they require
ISOs to take financial positions in the markets.
1.3 Scope and Contributions of This Thesis
In this thesis, we study coordinated transaction scheduling (CTS )—a coordination
scheme for the determination of interchange evaluation. We are interested in the
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analysis and the quantification of the performance of CTS. In addition, we would
like to have a consistent basis that allows the side-by-side comparison of CTS with
any other coordination scheme. The discussion in Section 1.1 indicated that, for
the analysis and the evaluation of the performance of a coordination scheme, it is
required to explicitly represent the physical aspects, economic aspects, steps of the
coordination procedure, and the interactions among them. In order to both aid the
analysis and the quantification of the performance of a coordination scheme, and to
have a consistent basis that allows the comparison of any two coordination schemes,
we construct a two-layered framework. The framework is general, it can be used for
the evaluation and the performance metric evaluation of any coordination scheme,
and can accommodate any choice of representation. In addition, the framework
is comprehensive as it accommodates the representation of all required aspects in-
volving the analysis and the performance metric evaluation of a coordination scheme.
For the analysis and the quantification of the performance of CTS, we tailor this
framework for CTS and develop appropriate models for the required representation.
As discussed in Section 1.1, in order for the IGOs of the interconnected systems
to execute a coordination scheme, they need to share certain data/information and
must maintain the confidentiality of the unshared information as their private in-
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formation. We represent the flow of data/information between the IGOs by the
interactions between the respective models of the framework. The respective models
of the IGOs accommodated in the framework interact with each other according
to the sharing specifications of data/information. CTS consists of procedural steps
that utilize these data/information, and the steps of the CTS must be executed se-
quentially by the interconnected IGOs in a coordinated way. We use the framework
for the provision of an analytical underpinning of CTS, and the formulation of the
required tasks in the procedural steps of CTS. We illustrate the execution of CTS
step-by-step using two sample data sets. We conduct various sensitivity analyses,
and study the dependence of the interchange amount and total payments on certain
data/information regarding the physical and economic aspects of the interconnected
power systems.
We consider the elapsed time durations of the procedural steps of CTS, and iden-
tify the binding constraints for each procedural step so as to work toward shorter
coordination periods. The discussion in Section 1.1 pointed out the importance of
coordination period duration for interchange evaluation. We study the dependence
of the demand forecast performance on the coordination period duration. In order
to observe the dependence of interchange on the coordination period duration, we
9
use real-time market prices to simulate the interchange for different coordination
periods. Such a simulation allows us to observe the impact of shorter coordination
period duration on interchange. We also study TLO, and use the results obtained
via TLO as a benchmark to compare the results obtained via CTS.
The thesis contains five additional chapters. In Chapter 2, we construct a framework
for interchange evaluation methodologies. This framework consists of two intercon-
nected layers: physical layer and economic layer. We describe the layers of the
framework, as well as possible interactions of the models that get accommodated in
the layers of the framework. In Chapter 3, we study the procedural steps of CTS. We
tailor the framework constructed in Chapter 2 for CTS, develop the power system
and market models that get accommodated in the respective layers of the framework,
and formulate the procedural steps of CTS. We discuss the rationale of certain tasks
in the procedural steps of CTS, and provide insights into how certain tasks influence
the total payments and the interchange amount. In Chapter 4, we provide illustra-
tive examples for the execution of CTS, and provide a step-by-step explanation. We
conduct various sensitivity analyses, and study the dependence of the interchange
amount and total payment on certain data/information regarding the physical and
economic aspects of the interconnected power systems. In Chapter 5, we assess the
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time duration of each procedural step of CTS. We identify the limiting constraints
of the time duration of each step so as to assess the feasibility to undertake CTS
with shorter coordination periods. We perform simulations for different coordination
periods, and discuss the results of these simulations and provide important insights
into the impacts of coordination period durations. In Chapter 6, we provide our
concluding remarks together with a summary of this thesis, and discuss directions
for future research to extend the results in this thesis. The thesis has two appendices.
In Appendix A, we provide the notation used in this thesis. We dedicate Appendix
B to TLO. We develop appropriate power system and market models, and present
the formulation of the procedural steps of TLO.
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CHAPTER 2
FRAMEWORK FOR INTERCHANGE
EVALUATION METHODOLOGIES
The review in Chapter 1 makes it clear that the analysis and the quantification of
the performance of the diverse interchange schemes—with their salient characteris-
tics and specific structures, and their associated information needs—are challenging
problems. From now on, for the purposes of brevity, we refer to the interchange eval-
uation scheme, its characteristics and structure, and its associated information needs
by the all-inclusive term interchange evaluation methodology. The interchange eval-
uation decision is fraught with many sources of uncertainty, including the demand
forecast, the availability of conventional resources, and the time-varying, uncertain,
and intermittent nature of renewable energy resources. Moreover, for each side of
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the interchange, there is price uncertainty with respect to the other side. The in-
terchange evaluation methodologies require that data be shared between the two
interconnected IGOs on a symmetric basis, and that they jointly participate in the
performance of the coordination scheme. However, each IGO wants to maintain the
confidentiality of the data/information of its system, and prefers to share as little
data/information as possible, which limits the information that is made available for
the decision of interchange evaluation. The discussion of TLO in Chapter 1 makes
clear that TLO is an ideal case that assumes the hypothetical aggregation of the
two interconnected systems. If this ideal were possible, there would no longer be
the problem of interchange, because the hypothetical aggregation would result in a
single system. Unfortunately, such a hypothetical aggregation is not realistic under
current conditions, as no IGO would be willing to give the control of its system to
a higher authority.
The analysis and the quantification of the performance of any interchange evalu-
ation methodology require the explicit representation of the physical aspects, the
economic aspects, the steps of the coordination scheme, and all the interactions
among them. The physical aspects include the power system components of each
IGO that are deployed for interchange, as well as the associated power flows. The
13
economic aspects include the determination of the costs and benefits associated with
the wholesale purchase/sale of electricity performed in each system, with the partic-
ular coordination scheme explicitly taken into account. Clearly, the determination
of the costs and benefits may or may not be market-based. While each IGO has the
data/information on its physical aspects and its economic aspects, the interchange
requires that some subset of data/information is shared with the neighboring IGO.
The analysis and the performance evaluation for each methodology can be greatly
aided by the construction of a framework that accommodates the required represen-
tation of the physical aspects, the economic aspects, the steps of the coordination
scheme, and all the interactions among them. However, in light of the diversity
of the extant methodologies, the fact that a framework is suitable for a particu-
lar interchange evaluation methodology does not imply its suitability for any other
interchange evaluation methodology. Hence, we cannot use any framework that is
suitable for a particular interchange evaluation methodology as a basis that allows
the comparison of any two interchange evaluation methodologies in a consistent way.
As such, it makes sense to construct a common framework that can incorporate
the salient characteristics of each methodology in terms of the appropriate models
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and tools needed for the analysis and the performance evaluation. Such a com-
mon framework allows the side-by-side comparison of any two interchange evalua-
tion methodologies and may be used to accommodate each of the methodologies in
Chapter 1 and proposed future methodologies.
The two requirements of the framework are generality and comprehensiveness. The
framework must be sufficiently general to include all existing and possibly proposed
interchange schemes. As existing and possibly proposed schemes may or may not
be market-based, the framework must allow the representation of both market-based
and non-market-based schemes as appropriate to the particular situation. The frame-
work must also be comprehensive and accommodate the representation of the power
system components and the associated power flows, as well as the economic represen-
tation and the coordination scheme of the interchange. In addition, the framework
must also be able to accommodate all data/information flows required by the inter-
change evaluation methodology.
We devote this chapter to the development of such a framework for interchange
evaluation methodologies. We explain the design and construction of the framework
in Section 2.1. In Section 2.2 we describe the physical layer, and in Section 2.3 we
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discuss the economic layer of the framework. We summarize the chapter and state
our concluding remarks in Section 2.4.
2.1 Design and Construction of the Framework
In this thesis, we focus on the intra-hourly subperiod [k]
∣∣
h
, and consider [k]
∣∣
h
as
the coordination period for interchange evaluation. For a given day, we express all
time elements in minutes (min) and a time element τ denotes the cumulative min-
utes elapsed from the start of the day, at 0 min. The term h is the index for the
hourly periods of a day such that h = 1, 2, ..., 24. We define the hourly period as
Th , {τ : (h− 1)(60) < τ ≤ (h)(60)}.
We consider K intra-hourly subperiods of equal duration for each hour h, and in-
troduce the index k for the intra-hourly subperiods such that k = 1, 2, ..., K. We
denote the duration of each intra-hourly subperiod by ζ. We define the intra-hourly
subperiod as T
[k]
∣∣
h
, {τ : (h− 1)(60) + (k − 1)(ζ) < τ ≤ (h− 1)(60) + (k)(ζ)}. The
time frame of our analysis is illustrated in Figure 2.1.
We construct the framework for interchange evaluation methodologies for two in-
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Figure 2.1: Time scale of the framework
terconnected IGOs: IGOA and IGOB. In order to meet the requirement of the
explicit representation of the physical aspects and the economic aspects, the frame-
work is designed to consist of two interconnected layers: the physical layer and the
economic layer. The physical layer accommodates the representation of the power
system components and the associated power flows of the two systems that are de-
ployed by the particular interchange methodology. The representation of the power
system components and the associated power flows is done via the development of
appropriate models. The choice of the particular model depends on the particular
interchange evaluation methodology, as well as the level of detail required by the spe-
cific application. The physical layer of the framework can accommodate any choice
of model for the representation of the physical assets and the associated power flows
of the two systems.
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The economic layer accommodates the economic representation of the two inter-
connected systems and the coordination scheme. The economic representation of the
systems and the particular choice of coordination scheme is done via the deployment
of appropriate models. Although the economic representation of the systems are
mostly market-based in North America, in order to render the framework general,
we do not specify the economic models of the systems. The economic layer is able
to accommodate any choice of model for the economic representation of the systems
and the coordination scheme.
The models in the physical layer and the economic layer interact with each other
via data/information flows. The flow of data/information can be between the mod-
els in the same layer, as well as between the models in different layers. The framework
is able to accommodate any flow of data/information between any models in the two
layers. The data/information can take many forms, including power flow, sensor
measurements, and economic information. The framework is able to distinguish the
different forms of data/information that is exchanged between the models. The share
of data/information between the two interconnected IGOs is a critical matter. Each
IGO is the single entity responsible for the administration of its system, and it is
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in the interest of each IGO to maintain the confidentiality of the data/information
of its system. However, the coordination scheme may require the sharing of certain
data/information. The framework is able to distinguish the sharing specifications
of all data/information, and is able to accommodate the sharing of data/informa-
tion between only the respective models. The general structure of the framework is
provided in Figure 2.2.
Figure 2.2: General structure of the framework
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2.2 The Physical Layer
We designed the proposed framework to consist of the physical layer and the economic
layer. The physical layer accommodates the representation of the power system com-
ponents and the associated power flows of the two systems that are deployed for the
decision of interchange evaluation. The representation of the power system compo-
nents and the associated power flows of the interchange is done via the deployment
of appropriate models. The general structure of the physical layer is provided in
Figure 2.3.
Figure 2.3: Physical layer
The physical layer accommodates the IGOA and IGOB power system models. Con-
sidering the actual power system components, each IGO operates its transmission
network, which contains a certain number of busses, internal transmission lines, and
transformers. The generators that are connected to a bus of the transmission network
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inject power, and the loads in each bus withdraw power. The power system model
of each IGO contains an abstract representation of these power system components
and the associated power flows, and regardless of the particular choice of model, the
physical layer can accommodate any choice for the IGOA and IGOB power system
models.
The physical power systems of IGOA and IGOB are connected via tie line(s). A
tie-line is a physical transmission line that connects a bus in one IGO to another bus
in the other IGO. There may be one or more physical tie-lines between the two inter-
connected IGOs, and the power flows between the two interconnected IGOs through
the tie-line(s). For the purposes of interchange evaluation decision, the exchange of
power between the two interconnected IGOs is modeled to be on the interface be-
tween the two IGOs. The physical layer also accommodates the interface, regardless
of the particular choice of model.
The choice of the particular models that are accommodated in the physical layer
is commensurate with the needs of the particular interchange evaluation methodol-
ogy and the application, and the physical layer is able to accommodate any choice
of model for the IGOA power system, the IGOB power system, and the interface.
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2.3 The Economic Layer
The other layer in the proposed framework is the economic layer. The economic
layer accommodates the economic representation of the two systems and the coor-
dination scheme. The economic representation of the systems and the coordination
scheme is done via the deployment of appropriate models. The general structure of
the economic layer is provided in Figure 2.4.
Figure 2.4: Economic layer
Each system has a certain economic scheme by which the wholesale purchase/sale
of electricity is performed. In the systems in North America, the wholesale pur-
chase/sale of electricity is performed usually via an electricity market that that has
a uniform-price double-sided auction mechanism. However, different schemes may
also be used by an IGO to perform the wholesale purchase/sale of electricity. The
economic scheme by which the wholesale purchase/sale of electricity is performed in
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each IGO is represented via the economic model of that IGO. Regardless of the
particular choice of model, the economic layer of the proposed framework accommo-
dates the IGOA economic system model and the IGOB economic system model.
The coordination scheme is the specific mechanism that is jointly deployed for the de-
cision of interchange evaluation by the two interconnected IGOs. The economic layer
of the proposed framework also accommodates any choice of coordination scheme.
The framework allows the interaction of any models in any two layers of the frame-
work. The interactions may be in the form of power flow data, sensor measurements
and economic information. Depending on the specific interchange methodology and
the application for which the framework is used, the represented flows of data/infor-
mation between the models may differ. The power system model of a system in the
physical layer may pass sensor measurements and power flow data to the economic
model of that system in the economic layer. The economic models of the systems
may exchange certain economic information with the coordination scheme. The co-
ordination scheme in the economic layer may pass the evaluated interchange flow
amount to the interface in the physical layer. The framework is able to accommo-
date any of these flows of data/information, and distinguish the form of the passed
23
data/information.
Given that each IGO wants to maintain the confidentiality of its data/informa-
tion and wants to share as little data/information as possible, the framework is
designed so as to consider the sharing specifications of data/information. Hence, the
framework enables the sharing of data/information to be between only the specified
models. The detailed structure of the framework is provided in Figure 2.5.
2.4 Concluding Remarks and Summary
In this chapter, we have described a framework for the analysis and the quantifica-
tion of the performance of interchange evaluation methodologies. In order to meet
the requirements for the explicit representation of the physical aspects, the economic
aspects, the interactions between the economic aspects, and the steps of the coordi-
nation scheme, we have constructed the framework to consist of two interconnected
layers: the physical layer and the economic layer. We have designed the framework
so as to render it general and comprehensive for the analysis and the performance
evaluation of interchange evaluation methodologies. The framework is general, as it
can be used to do the analysis and performance evaluation of any interchange evalu-
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ation methodology, and can accommodate any physical model, economic model, and
coordination scheme in its respective layers. The generality of the framework enables
it to serve as a consistent basis for the side-by-side comparison of interchange eval-
uation methodologies. The framework is comprehensive, as it accommodates all the
models and tools required for the decision of interchange evaluation, as well as their
interactions with each other, in a unified construct. In the following chapters, we will
apply the framework introduced in this chapter to the analysis and the quantification
of the performance of coordinated transaction scheduling (CTS).
25
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CHAPTER 3
PROCEDURAL STEPS OF COORDINATED
TRANSACTION SCHEDULING
In this chapter, we discuss coordinated transaction scheduling (CTS), which is a
scheme that is jointly deployed by two interconnected IGOs to determine their in-
terchange evaluation.1 We have constructed the framework in Chapter 2 so as to
make it general and comprehensive, which enabled the framework to be used for
the analysis and the quantification of the performance of any interchange evaluation
methodology. In this chapter, we tailor the framework constructed in Chapter 2 for
CTS, and present the models that are accommodated in the physical and economic
layer of the framework, as well as the interactions between the models. Using the
1Our description of CTS in this chapter is based on [1], which has been deployed by the Inde-
pendent System Operator-New England (ISO-NE) and New York Independent System Operator
(NY ISO) since December 15, 2015.
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CTS framework, we present the procedural steps of CTS, and describe the execu-
tion of each step considering the required data/information exchange between the
models. Throughout the chapter, we adopt the time convention that is explained in
Section 2.1, and focus on the coordination period [k]
∣∣
h
to discuss the execution of
CTS. In Section 3.1, we tailor the framework described in Chapter 2 to develop the
CTS framework. We devote Sections 3.2–3.5 to discuss of the steps of CTS. Finally,
we provide the concluding remarks and the summary of the chapter in Section 3.6.
3.1 The CTS Framework
In the previous chapter, we have presented a general and comprehensive framework
that could be used for the analysis and the performance evaluation of any inter-
change evaluation methodology. In this section, we tailor the framework constructed
in Chapter 2 for CTS and provide the specific models that are accommodated in
the framework. While constructing the framework in Chapter 2, we denoted the two
interconnected IGOs as IGOA as IGOB. In the CTS framework—for reasons that
will become clear in the rest of the chapter—we refer to IGOA as IGOM and IGOB
as IGO F .
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In order to accommodate the explicit representations of the physical aspects, eco-
nomic aspects, the interactions between the physical and economic aspects, and the
coordination scheme, we have constructed the framework to consist of two inter-
connected layers: the physical layer and the economic layer. The physical layer of
the framework accommodates the IGOM power system model, IGO F power system
model, and the interface.
Each IGO operates its transmission network, which contains a certain number of
busses, internal transmission lines, and transformers. The generators that are con-
nected to a bus of the transmission network inject power, and the loads in each bus
withdraw power. For the purposes of interchange evaluation, we model the power
system of each IGO such that each power system contains a single bus. We denote
the bus of IGOM by † and the bus of IGO F by ‡. In addition to a single bus, the
power system model of each IGO contains the information on the generators in that
system.
The two power systems are physically connected via tie-line(s). There may be one or
more physical tie-lines between the two interconnected IGOs, and the power flows
between the two interconnected IGOs through these tie-line(s). For the purposes
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of interchange evaluation, we model the power exchange between the two intercon-
nected IGOs to be on the interface between † and ‡. Hence, IGO F proxy bus for
IGOM is †, and IGOM proxy bus for IGO F is ‡. We denote the interface exchange
amount by f `, and use the convention that if the power exchange is from ‡ to †, then
f ` > 0, and if the power exchange is from † to ‡, then f ` < 0. We assume that the
interface is able to accommodate any interface exchange amount.
The other layer in the framework constructed in Chapter 2 is the economic layer,
which accommodates all the economic aspects of interchange evaluation and the co-
ordination scheme. We introduce the IGOM (IGO F ) internal market model, which
is the mechanism by which IGOM (IGO F ) performs the wholesale purchase/sale of
electricity of its system. We consider that IGOM and IGO F market models have a
uniform-price single-sided auction mechanism. The internal market players of each
IGO sell energy directly to the IGO by submitting sealed internal offers. Each such
internal offer i (j)—where i = 1, 2, ..., I (j = 1, 2, ..., J)—that is submitted to the
bus of IGOM (IGO F ) is represented by the couplet β †i = {p †i , µ †i} (β ‡j = {p ‡j, µ ‡j}),
where p †i (p
‡
j) is the offered active power in MW and µ
†
i (µ
‡
j) $/MWh is the offer
price. We represent the set of all internal offers submitted at † (‡) by {β †} ({β ‡}).
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In our analysis of the internal markets for the coordination period, we consider the
intra-hour demand in the market model of each IGO to be price-insensitive. We refer
to the intra-hour demand of each IGO as the residual demand that is not cleared in
the day-ahead market and that needs to be cleared during the coordination period
[k]
∣∣
h
either by the IGO’s internal offers or by importing power from the neighboring
IGO. We represent the intra-hour demand at the bus † (‡) with d † (d ‡). The intra-
hour demand considered in this chapter is essentially a forecasted demand, which we
assume to remain constant during the coordination period. In practice, the demand
may differ from the forecasted value and change within the coordination period. We
study the dependence of the CTS results on the duration of the coordination period
in Chapter 5.
The economic layer also accommodates the CTS model, in which the procedural
steps of CTS are executed. CTS includes an offer form called interface offer 2 which
is an offer submitted to transact power from one bus to the other on the interface.
An interface offer c (n) that expresses the willingness to transact p ‡→†c (p
†→‡
n ) MW
from ‡ (†) to † (‡) under the condition that χ† − χ‡ ≥ µ‡→†c (χ‡ − χ† ≥ µ†→‡n ) is
expressed as the couplet β ‡→†c = {p ‡→†c , µ ‡→†c } (β †→‡n = {p †→‡n , µ †→‡n }). Hence,
the interface offer corresponds to the offer of p ‡→†c (p
†→‡
n ) MW of withdrawal at
2In [1], the term interface bid is used instead of interface offer.
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‡ (†) and p ‡→†c (p †→‡n ) of injection at † (‡) as long as the marginal price at † (‡)
exceeds that of ‡ (†) at least by µ ‡→†c (µ †→‡n ). A distinguishing feature of an inter-
face offer from an internal offer is that an interface offer is submitted on the basis of
marginal price difference between † and ‡, and is indifferent to the actual marginal
price values at † and ‡.
The models described above get accommodated in their respective layers of the frame-
work. Specifically, IGOM power system model, IGO F power system model, and the
interface get accommodated in the physical layer, and the IGOM internal market
model, IGO F internal market model, and the CTS model get accommodated in the
economic layer. Each IGO needs to collect the required data and prepare the neces-
sary information on its system through the appropriate models prior to the execution
of CTS. The models in the framework interact with each other through the flow
of these data/information. Whether the model of an IGO shares its data/informa-
tion with the model of a neighboring IGO is a critical matter, because each IGO
wants to maintain the confidentiality of its data/information. Hence, we decide on
the sharing of the data/information so as to allow the CTS to run with minimum
data/information exchange between the models of the two interconnected IGOs.
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The status of the generators in each power system model in the physical layer is
passed to its respective internal market model in the economic layer, and then is
passed to the CTS model in the economic layer. The status of the interface is
passed from the physical layer to the CTS model in the economic layer. Each IGO
collects its internal offers from the internal market participants, and obtains the
intra-hour demand in its internal market model. The internal offers and the intra-
hour demand of each IGO are passed from its respective internal market model in
the economic layer to the CTS model in the economic layer. The interface offers are
also directly submitted to the CTS model in the economic layer. CTS is executed
in the economic layer of the framework using the data/information that is passed to
the CTS model. In the following sections, we explain the procedural steps of CTS.
3.2 Step 1: Determination of the Interface Exchange
Direction
The initial step of CTS is to determine the direction of the interface exchange. This
is a critical step because CTS ensures that the power exchange on the interface is
from the bus with the lower marginal price to that with the higher marginal price.3
3The prices that we refer to in this chapter are all ex-ante prices that are determined based on
the forecasted intra-hour demands and the submitted offers. The ex-post prices may different as
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In this step, we assume that each IGO meets its forecasted intra-hour demand with-
out resorting to the interface exchange. Such an assumption enables us to obtain
what the marginal price of electricity at each bus would have been, had there been
no utilization of the interface exchange for the intra-hour market. Based on these
marginal prices that are obtained without resorting to the interface exchange, we
designate the interface exchange direction so that it is from the bus with the lower
marginal price to that with the higher marginal price.
For the determination of the interface exchange direction, the CTS model solves
an ED problem for each IGO using the submitted internal offers and its intra-hour
demand. In order to formulate the ED problem, we introduce the variable a´ †i (a´
‡
j),
which represents the cleared real power in MW from the i th (j th) submitted internal
offer. Hence, a´ †i , i = 1, 2, ...I (a´
‡
j, j = 1, 2, ...J) serve as the optimization variables
in the ED problem formulation of Step 1.
The ED problem at † is formulated as:
the actual intra-hour demand may differ from the forecasted intra-hour demand. Although CTS
ensures that the interface exchange direction is from the bus with the lower ex-ante marginal price
to that with the higher ex-ante marginal price, it cannot ensure the same for ex-post marginal
prices. We discuss this issue in detail in Chapter 5.
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min
a´ †i
I∑
i=1
(a´ †i ) (µ
†
i )
s.t.
I∑
i=1
a´i − d¯ † = 0 ←→ χ´ †
a´i − pi ≤ 0 i = 1, 2, ...I
(3.1)
The optimal decision variables a´ †i
∗
i = 1, 2, ...I indicate the MW of power cleared
from the internal offers i = 1, 2, ...I by solving (3.1). The exact same problem is
solved for IGO F and the optimal decision variables a´ ‡j
∗
j = 1, 2, ...J are obtained
for IGO F .
We denote the dual variable associated with the equality constraint at the opti-
mum for IGOM (IGO F ) as χ´ † ∗ (χ´ ‡ ∗). χ´ † ∗ and χ´ ‡ ∗ imply the marginal price to
serve an additional MW of demand at † and ‡, respectively. Based on χ´ † ∗ and χ´ ‡ ∗,
the CTS model determines which interface offers are incorporated to the following
steps of CTS, and which interface offers are not considered. If χ´ † ∗ < χ´ ‡ ∗, then the
interface offers submitted to transact power from † to ‡ are incorporated into the
following steps of CTS, and the interface offers submitted to transact power from ‡
to † are not considered in the subsequent steps. On the other hand, if χ´ ‡ ∗ < χ´ † ∗,
then the interface offers submitted to transact power from ‡ to † are incorporated
into the following steps of CTS, and the interface offers submitted to transact power
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from † to ‡ are not considered in the subsequent steps.
The incorporation of the interface offers is critical in CTS because the interface
offers can be submitted to transact power in either direction. Hence, the interface
offers can be submitted to transact power from the bus with the higher marginal
price to the bus with the lower marginal price, which is contrary to the aim of the
interface and is economically counter-intuitive. The motivation behind the incor-
poration of only the interface offers that are submitted in the direction from the
bus with the lower marginal price to that with the higher marginal price is to en-
sure that the interface exchange is economically intuitive and that such economically
counter-intuitive interface offers are not considered. Once Step 1 is completed, the
two IGOs know the direction of the interface exchange, which is aligned with the
intuitive notion of exchange from the bus of the IGO with the lower marginal price
to the bus of the IGO with the higher marginal price.
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3.3 Step 2: Modification of the Internal Offers at
the Bus of IGOM
In this step, the interface offers are matched against the internal offers at † so as to
determine the possible modifications of the internal offers at †. The internal offers
at the bus † of IGOM are modified by the interface offers, and the internal offers at
the bus ‡ of IGO F remain fixed, hence the renaming of IGOA as IGOM and IGOB
as IGO F in this chapter.
We first explain the matching and the modification tasks for the case that inter-
face exchange is from ‡ to †. The tasks consist of the following substeps:
Substep 2. a (i): Arrange the interface offers from ‡ to † {β ‡→†} in the order of
increasing price differences to obtain µ ‡→†1 ≤ µ ‡→†2 ≤ ... ≤ µ ‡→†C . Arrange the inter-
nal offers {β †} in the order of decreasing offer prices to obtain µ †1 ≥ µ †2 ≥ ... ≥ µ †I .
Substep 2. a (ii): Set i = 1 and c = 1. If C < I; go to Substep 2. a (iii); otherwise,
go to Substep 2. a (v).
Substep 2. a (iii): Modify the internal offer β †i to create β˜
†
i = {p ‡→†c , µ †i − µ ‡→†c }
and β˜ †I+i = {p †i − p ‡→†c , µ †i}. Set i = i+ 1 and c = c+ 1.
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Substep 2. a (iv): If c = C, terminate; otherwise, return to Substep 2. a (iii).
Substep 2. a (v): Modify the internal offer β †i to create β˜
†
i = {p ‡→†c , µ †i − µ c} and
β˜ †I+i = {p †i − p ‡→†c , µ †i}. Set i = i+ 1 and c = c+ 1.
Substep 2. a (vi):If i = I, terminate; otherwise, return to Substep 2. a (v).
Substep 2. a (vii): Arrange the internal offers at † after modification {β˜ †} in the
order of decreasing offer prices to obtain µ˜ †1 ≥ µ˜ †2 ≥ ... ≥ µ˜ †I˜ .
The number of internal offers at † after the modification is denoted as I˜. If I ≥ C,
then C of the offers are modified to create 2C offers, and I − C offers remain un-
changed; therefore, I˜ = I + C. If I < C, then the I offers are modified to create
2I modified offers, and each initial offer is modified; therefore, I˜ = 2I.
For the case that the interface exchange is from † to ‡, the matching and the modi-
fication tasks consist of the following substeps:
Substep 2. b (i): Arrange the interface offers from † to ‡ {β †→‡} in the order of
increasing price differences to obtain µ †→‡1 ≤ µ †→‡2 ≤ ... ≤ µ †→‡N . Arrange the in-
ternal offers {β †} in the order of decreasing offer prices to obtain µ †1 ≥ µ †2 ≥ ... ≥ µ †I .
Substep 2. b (ii): Set i = 1 and n = 1. If N < I; go to Substep 2. b (iii); otherwise;
go to Substep 2 .b (v).
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Substep 2. b (iii): Modify the internal offer β †i to create β˜
†
i = {p †→‡n , µ †i + µ †→‡n }
and β˜ †I+i = {p †i − p †→‡n , µ †i}. Set i = i+ 1 and n = n+ 1.
Substep 2. b (iv): If n = N , terminate; otherwise, return to Substep 2. b (iii).
Substep 2. b (v): Modify the internal offer β †i to create β˜
†
i = {p †→‡n , µ †i + µ †→‡n }
and β˜ †I+i = {p †i −p †→‡n , µ †i}. Set i = i+1 and n = n+1. Substep 2. b (vi): If i = I,
terminate; otherwise, return to Substep 2. b (v).
Substep 2. b (vii): Arrange the internal offers at † after modification {β˜ †} in the
order of decreasing offer prices to obtain µ˜ †1 ≥ µ˜ †2 ≥ ... ≥ µ˜ †I˜ .
If I ≥ N , then N of the offers are modified to create 2N offers, and I − N offers
remain unchanged; therefore, I˜ = I + N . If I < N , then the I offers are mod-
ified to create 2I modified offers, and each initial offer is modified; therefore, I˜ = 2I.
The matching of the internal offers at † with the interface offers is a preparatory
step prior to the modification of the internal offers at † by the interface offers. The
rationale of the rearrangement of the order of the internal offers at † from the highest
offer price to the lowest offer price, and that of the interface offers from the lowest
price difference to the highest price difference, is to ensure that the offer price of
the expensive offers are reduced as small as possible and the expensive offers do not
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get cleared after the modification. Had the internal offer with the highest offer price
been matched by the interface offer with the highest price difference, then the offer
price of the modified internal offer could have decreased significantly, and such an
expensive internal offer could have cleared due to its significantly reduced price after
its modification.
The incorporation of the interface offers in CTS renders CTS a procedure that
harnesses market forces to determine the interchange evaluation. The rationale be-
hind the particular way of modification of the internal offers at † is provided for two
distinct cases of interface exchanges.
For the case that the interface exchange is from ‡ to †, only the interface offers
{β ‡→†}, which are submitted to transact power from ‡ to †, are considered. The
match of the interface offer β ‡→†c = {p ‡→†c , µ ‡→†c } with the internal offer at †
β †i = {p †i , µ †i} translates as p ‡→†c MW of withdrawal from ‡ at the price (µ †i−µ ‡→†c )
$/MWh and p ‡→†c MW of injection to † at the price µ †i $/MWh, in line with the
condition of the interface offer of at least µ ‡→†c price difference between the two
buses. The modification of the internal offer β †i = {p †i , µ †i} by the interface offer
β ‡→†c = {p ‡→†c , µ ‡→†c } creates the modified internal offer β˜ †i˜ = {p ‡→†c , µ
†
i − µ ‡→†c }
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at †. The price and power values of the created fictitious internal offer at † are iden-
tical to the price and power values by which the interface offerer wishes to withdraw
at ‡. Therefore, the fictitious creation of the identical offer at † obviates the need to
transact that power from ‡, and acts as a barrier to the interface offerer that wishes
to take advantage of the price difference across the interface.
For the case that the interface exchange is from † to ‡, only the interface offers
submitted to transact power from † to ‡ are considered. The match of an interface
offer β †→‡n = {p †→‡n , µ †→‡n } with the internal offer at † β †i = {p †i , µ †i} translates as
p †→‡n MW of withdrawal from † at the price (µ †i ) $/MWh and p †→‡n MW of injection
to ‡ at the price µ †i + µ †→‡n $/MWh, in line with the condition of the interface offer
of at least φ †→‡n price difference between the two buses. The modification of the
internal offer β †i = {p †i , µ †i} by the interface offer β †→‡n = {p †→‡n , µ †→‡n } creates the
modified internal offer β˜ †
i˜
= {p †→‡n , µ †i + µ †→‡n } at †. The price and power values of
the created fictitious internal offer at † are identical to the price and power values
by which the interface offerer wishes to inject at ‡. Therefore, the fictitious creation
of the identical offer at † obviates the need to transact that power to ‡, and acts as
a barrier to the interface offerer that wishes to take advantage of the price difference
across the interface.
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For both cases, only the internal offers at † are modified, and the internal offers
at ‡ remain unchanged. This is to ensure that the modification can act as a barrier
to the interface offerer that wishes to take advantage of the price difference across
the interface. If the internal offers at both † and ‡ were modified, then the price
difference across the interface would remain the same. Since the interface offerer is
only interested in the price difference across the interface, the modifications of the
internal offers at both † and ‡ have no impact on the interface offerer.
3.4 Step 3: Determination of the Interface Exchange
Amount
The CTS model that is accommodated in the economic layer of the CTS framework
determines the interface exchange amount as a by-product of the solution of yet an-
other ED problem. This ED problem assumes the hypothetical aggregation of the
two interconnected IGOs to form a single system, and is solved based on the modi-
fied internal offers at † {β˜ †}, the internal offers ‡ {β ‡}, and the combined forecasted
intra-hour demands at † and ‡, d † + d ‡. In order to formulate the ED problem, we
again use the variable a ‡j (a˜ i˜
†), which represents the cleared real power in MW from
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the j th (˜i th) internal offer. Hence, a ‡j, j = 1, 2, ...J and a˜ i˜
†, i˜ = 1, 2, ...I˜ serve as
the optimization variables in the ED problem formulation.
The ED problem for the hypothetically aggregated system can be formulated as
follows:
min
a˜ †
i˜
, a ‡j
I˜∑
i˜=1
(a˜ †
i˜
) (µ˜ †
i˜
) +
J∑
j=1
(a ‡j ) (µ
‡
j)
s.t.
I˜∑
i˜=1
a˜i˜ +
J∑
j=1
aj − (d † + d ‡) = 0 ←→ χ˜
a˜i˜ − p˜i˜ ≤ 0 i˜ = 1, 2, ...I˜
aj − pj ≤ 0 j = 1, 2, ...J
(3.2)
The optimal decision variables a˜ †
i˜
∗
i˜ = 1, 2, ...I˜ and a ‡j
∗
j = 1, 2, ...J indicate the
MW of power cleared from the internal offers i˜ = 1, 2, ...I˜ and j = 1, 2, ...J by
solving (3.2). Further, we denote the dual variable associated with the equality con-
straint at the optimum as χ˜ ∗. χ˜ ∗ is the marginal price to serve the last MW of the
aggregated demand d † + d ‡.
The total power sold by the internal offerers at † can be represented as ∑I˜i˜=1 a˜ †i˜ ∗.
Similarly, the total power sold by the internal offerers of ‡ can be represented as
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∑J
j=1 a
‡
j
∗
. Referring to our convention that if the interface exchange is from ‡ to †,
then f ` > 0, and if the interface exchange is from † to ‡, then f ` < 0, we can write
the following set of equations for the interface exchange
J∑
j=1
a ‡j
∗
= d ‡ + f `
I˜∑
i˜=1
a˜ †
i˜
∗
+ f ` = d
†
(3.3)
Hence, after the completion of this step, the interface exchange amount f ` is deter-
mined. The determined interface exchange amount is passed from the CTS model
accommodated in the economic layer to the interface model accommodated in the
physical layer.
As explained in Appendix B, tie-line optimization (TLO) is a conceptual construct
to determine the interface exchange amount between † and ‡. TLO assumes that
the two interconnected systems are hypothetically aggregated to form a single super-
system. The super-system is operated by a super-IGO that overtakes the functions
of both IGOs and so has the knowledge of the offers and the intra-hour demands of
the two IGOs. In TLO, the super -IGO solves an ED problem for the super-system
based on the internal offers and intra-hour demands at † and ‡. This step can be
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considered as a TLO-like procedure, as similar to the TLO, an ED problem is solved
for the hypothetically aggregated system. However, instead of the initial internal of-
fers at †, the modified internal offers are used, which distinguishes this step from the
TLO.
In the case that the interface exchange is from ‡ to †, the problem formulation
(3.2) implies that the total cleared power from the internal offers at † increases with
the modification because the modified offers are at prices equal to or below the initial
internal offers at †. Therefore, the CTS procedure clears more internal offers at †
than under the condition that the initial internal offers of † were used instead of the
modified internal offers at †. Since TLO differs from CTS only by the use of the
original internal offers at † instead of the modified internal offers at †, CTS proce-
dure clears more internal offers at † than TLO does when the interface exchange is
from ‡ to †. Such an increase of the cleared internal offers at † is counter-intuitive
because for the case that the interface exchange is from ‡ to †, it is desired to meet
the forecasted intra-hour demand with the cheaper internal offers at ‡ instead of the
more expensive internal offers at †.
In the case that the interface exchange is from † to ‡, the problem formulation
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(3.2) implies that the total cleared power from the internal offers at † decreases with
the modification because the modified offers are at prices greater than or equal to
the initial internal offers at †. Therefore, the CTS procedure clears more internal
offers at ‡ than under the condition that the initial internal offers of † were used
instead of the modified internal offers at †. Since TLO differs from CTS only by the
use of the original internal offers at † instead of the modified internal offers at †, the
CTS procedure clears more internal offers at ‡ than TLO does when the interface
exchange is from † to ‡. Such an increase of the cleared internal offers at ‡ is again
counter-intuitive because, for the case that the interface exchange is from † to ‡, it
is desired to meet the forecasted intra-hour demand with the cheaper internal offers
at † instead of the more expensive internal offers at ‡.
The counter-intuitive increase in the cleared internal offers at † when the interface
exchange is from ‡ to †, and the counter-intuitive increase in the cleared internal
offers at ‡ when the interface exchange is from † to ‡, will help us understand why
the total payments obtained via CTS is higher than or equal to those obtained with
TLO in the next section.
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3.5 Step 4: Clearance of the Internal Offers and the
Interface Offers
In the previous step, the CTS model has determined the total power that must be
cleared from the internal offers at †, ∑I˜i˜=1 a˜ †i ∗, and the internal offers at ‡, ∑Jj=1 a ‡j∗.
In this step, the original internal offers submitted to the bus of each system are cleared
such that the total power that must be cleared in that bus is met in the most eco-
nomical way. Namely, the original internal offers at † {β †} are cleared in the most
economical way such that the total cleared power at † is ∑I˜i˜=1 a˜ †i ∗. Similarly, the
original internal offers at ‡ {β ‡} are cleared in the most economical way such that
the total cleared power at † is ∑Jj=1 a ‡j∗.
Once the cleared internal offers at † (‡) are determined, we evaluate the marginal
price of electricity to serve an additional MW of demand at †(‡), which we denote by
χ † (χ ‡). The CTS model determines which interface offers are cleared based on χ †
and χ ‡. If the interface exchange is from ‡ to †, then the interface offers with price
differences such that µ‡→†c ≤ µ † − µ ‡ are cleared, and those with µ‡→†c > µ † − µ ‡
are not cleared. If the interface exchange is from † to ‡, then the interface offers with
price differences such that µ†→‡n ≤ µ ‡ − µ † are cleared, and those with µ†→‡n > µ ‡
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- µ † are not cleared.
The intra-hour demands of the two interconnected IGOs are met with the origi-
nal internal offers because the modified internal offers are basically constructs of
CTS and not actual submitted offers. When the interface exchange is from ‡ to †,
we refer to our observation in Step 3 that CTS clears more internal offers at † than
does TLO. The higher amount of power cleared at † will be cleared from the initial
and more expensive internal offers at †, which causes the total payments incurred in
CTS to be greater than or equal to those obtained with TLO.
When the interface exchange is from † to ‡, we refer to our observation in Step
3 that CTS clears more internal offers at ‡ than does TLO. The higher amount of
power cleared at ‡ will be cleared from the more expensive initial internal offers at
‡, which causes the total payments incurred in CTS to be greater than or equal to
those obtained with TLO. When the interface exchange is from † to ‡, the modified
internal offers at † are more expensive than the initial internal offers at †; however,
the fictitious creation of the expensive internal offers at † precludes the utilization of
these cheap initial internal offers at † and makes the CTS model resort to the inter-
nal offers at ‡, which requires greater total payments. Therefore, the total payments
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obtained via CTS are greater than or equal to the total payments obtained via TLO
when the interface exchange is from † to ‡ as well.
When the interface exchange is from ‡ to †, only the interface offers with price
differences that are less than or equal to µ † − µ ‡ are cleared. Similarly, when the
interface exchange is from † to ‡, only the interface offers with price differences less
than or equal to µ ‡ − µ † are cleared. Therefore, an interface offerer who wishes
to clear the market must necessarily submit the interface offer with a smaller price
difference to be successful.
3.6 Concluding Remarks and Summary
In this chapter, we have discussed CTS. We have tailored the framework constructed
in Chapter 2 for CTS, and constructed the power system and internal market models
of the IGOs, as well as the interface model. We have described the data/information
that must be collected by the IGOs through the respective models. Since each IGO
wants to maintain the confidentiality of its data/information, we have decided on
the share of data/information for the execution of CTS so as to allow the CTS
to run with minimum data/information exchange between the models of the two
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interconnected IGOs. We have provided an analytical underpinning of CTS, and
explained the procedures of CTS in detail. In the first step of CTS, the interface
exchange direction is determined so as to ensure that it is from the bus with lower
marginal price to the bus with higher marginal price. Next, we have shown the
substeps for the modification of the internal offers at † by the interface offers for
the two cases of interface exchange direction. In the third step of CTS, we have
described the determination of the interface exchange amount. Finally, we have
shown the clearance of the internal offers at † and ‡, as well as the interface offers.
We have explained why the total payments obtained via CTS are greater than or
equal to those obtained via TLO. In Chapter 4, we will provide illustrative examples
of the execution of CTS. We will also identify the factors that influence the duration
of the execution of the steps of CTS in Chapter 5, and will work toward shortening
the coordination period.
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CHAPTER 4
ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES OF THE
EXECUTION OF CTS
The discussion of CTS in Chapter 3 provided an analytical underpinning and a
detailed description of the procedural steps of CTS. In this chapter, we illustrate
the execution of these procedural steps by the utilization of the CTS framework
described in Section 3.1. Throughout the chapter, we adopt the time convention
introduced in Section 2.1, and illustrate the execution of CTS for the coordination
period [k]
∣∣
h
. We introduce two sample data sets and input the data to the appropri-
ate models accommodated in the CTS framework. We illustrate the execution of the
steps described in Section 3.2–3.5 all the while referring to the appropriate models
of the CTS framework, as well as the required interactions between the models. We
obtain the interface exchange, cleared internal offers, cleared interface offers, and
the total payments for each data set. We conduct sensitivity analyses and study
51
the dependence of the interface exchange and the total payments on the submitted
internal and interface offers.
In Section 4.1, we introduce Data Set 1 and Data Set 2. In Section 4.2, we il-
lustrate the execution of the procedural steps of CTS for Data Set 1. We devote
Section 4.3 to the introduction of Data Set 2, and the illustration of the execution
of the procedural steps of CTS for Data Set 2. We conduct various sensitivity anal-
yses in Section 4.4. Finally, we present our concluding remarks and summarize the
chapter in Section 4.5.
4.1 Presentation of the Data Sets
In this section, we present two sample data sets, Data Set 1 and Data Set 2, which
serve as inputs to the respective models that get accommodated in the CTS frame-
work. The two data sets are used to illustrate both the execution of CTS in Sections
4.2 and 4.3, and the dependence of the interface exchange and the total payments
on a change in the internal offers or interface offers. Each data set contains the
internal offers at † and ‡, the intra-hour demands at † and ‡, and the interface offers.
Referring to the CTS framework developed in Section 3.1, the internal offers and the
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intra-hour demand at † (‡) serve as inputs to the IGOM (IGO F ) internal market
model that get accommodated in the economic layer of the framework. The interface
offers serve as inputs to the CTS model that get accommodated the economic layer
of the framework.
Data Set 1
Data Set 1 includes the internal offers at † and ‡, the intra-hour demands at † and
‡, and the interface offers. Table 4.1 lists the internal offers that are submitted to
sell power at the bus † of IGOM . We consider the intra-hour demand at the bus
† of IGOM as d † = 230MW . Table 4.2 lists the internal offers that are submitted
to sell power at the bus ‡ of IGO F . We consider the intra-hour demand at the bus
‡ of IGO F as d ‡ = 220MW . In Table 4.3, we provide the interface offers that are
submitted to transact power from the bus ‡ of IGO F to the bus † of IGOM . Finally,
Table 4.4 contains the interface offers that are submitted to transact power from the
bus † of IGOM to the bus ‡ of IGO F .
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Table 4.1: Data Set 1 internal offers at †
i β
†
i = {p †i , µ †i}
1 {170 , 12.00}
2 {150 , 11.00}
3 {120 , 10.00}
4 {120 , 9.00}
5 {70 , 8.00}
Table 4.2: Data Set 1 internal offers at ‡
j β
‡
j = {p ‡j , µ ‡j}
1 {150 , 8.00}
2 {130 , 9.00}
3 {100 , 10.00}
4 {130 , 10.50}
5 {120 , 12.00}
6 {100 , 13.00}
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Table 4.3: Data Set 1 ‡ to † interface offers
c β
‡→†
c = {p ‡→†c , µ ‡→†c }
1 {20 , 0.75}
2 {30 , 1.00}
3 {40 , 1.25}
4 {30 , 1.50}
Table 4.4: Data Set 1 † to ‡ interface offers
n β
†→‡
n = {p †→‡n , µ †→‡n }
1 {30 , 0.50}
2 {20 , 0.75}
3 {40 , 1.50}
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Data Set 2
In addition to the Data Set 1, we provide another data set, Data Set 2, which will
allow us to illustrate both the execution of CTS, and the dependence of the interface
exchange and the total payments on a change in the internal or interface offers. In
Table 4.5, we list the internal offers that are submitted to sell power at the bus † of
IGOM . We consider the intra-hour demand at the bus † of IGOM as d † = 150MW .
Table 4.6 contains the internal offers that are submitted to sell power at the bus ‡ of
IGO F . We consider the intra-hour demand at the bus ‡ of IGO F as d ‡ = 270MW .
Table 4.7 lists the interface offers that are submitted to transact power from the
bus ‡ of IGO F to the bus † of IGOM . Finally, Table 4.8 lists the interface offers
that are submitted to transact power from the bus † of IGOM to the bus ‡ of IGO F .
Table 4.5: Data Set 2 internal offers at †
i β
†
i = {p †i , µ †i}
1 {130 , 11.00}
2 {140 , 10.00}
3 {200 , 9.00}
4 {60 , 8.00}
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Table 4.6: Data Set 2 internal offers at ‡
j β
‡
j = {p ‡j , µ ‡j}
1 {80 , 8.00}
2 {90 , 9.00}
3 {110 , 10.00}
4 {140 , 11.00}
5 {100 , 12.00}
Table 4.7: Data Set 2 ‡ to † interface offers
c β
‡→†
c = {p ‡→†c , µ ‡→†c }
1 {30 , 0.75}
2 {20 , 1.00}
3 {30 , 1.50}
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Table 4.8: Data Set 2 † to ‡ interface offers
n β
†→‡
n = {p †→‡n , µ †→‡n }
1 {30 , 0.50}
2 {50 , 0.75}
3 {40 , 1.25}
4 {30 , 1.50}
5 {40 , 1.75}
4.2 Illustrative Example 1
In this section, we use the Data Set 1 presented in Section 4.1 to demonstrate the
steps of the CTS as explained in Chapter 3. The description of CTS in Chapter
3.1 shows us that before the two interconnected IGOs can begin the execution of
CTS they need to collect the required data/information, which serve as inputs to the
models that get accommodated in the CTS framework. The internal offers at † listed
in Table 4.1 and the intra-hour demand at † serve as inputs to the IGOM internal
market model in the economic layer, and the internal offers at ‡ listed in Table 4.2
and the intra-hour demand at ‡ serve as inputs to the IGO F internal market model
in the economic layer. The † to ‡ interface offers in Table 4.3 and the ‡ to † interface
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offers in Table 4.4 are provided as inputs to the CTS model in the economic layer.
The data/information need to be passed from the respective models to the CTS
model for the execution of CTS. The IGOM (IGO F ) internal market model passes
the internal offers at † (‡) and the intra-hour demand at † (‡) to the CTS model.
The required data/information are collected in the CTS model.
CTS Step 1: Determination of the interface exchange direction
The first step of CTS is the determination of the interface exchange direction. Fol-
lowing the analysis described in Section 3.2, the CTS model solves an ED problem
for each IGO that does not take into account the interface exchange. The opti-
mization variable of the ED problem for IGOM is a´ †i , which represents the cleared
real power in MW from the i th submitted internal offer at † for the ED problem
described in this step. The ED problem solved for IGOM is formulated in (4.1).
min
a´ †i
I∑
i=1
(a´ †i ) (µ
†
i )
s.t.
I∑
i=1
a´ †i − d † = 0 ←→ χ´ †
a´ †i − p †i ≤ 0 i = 1, 2, ...I
(4.1)
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where d † = 230 MW, and p †i and µ
†
i of the respective internal offer i at † are listed
in Table 4.1, for i = 1, .., I and I = 5.
The objective of the optimization problem is to meet the demand d † = 230 MW
in the cheapest way from the internal offers at † that are listed in Table 1. By obser-
vation, we can solve (4.1) by clearing the internal offers at Table 4.1 in the order of
lowest to highest offer prices. Table 4.9 indicates the cleared internal offer amounts
to meet the demand d † = 230 MW.
Table 4.9: Clearance of the internal offers at † for CTS Step 1
i β †i = {p †i , µ †i} a´
†
i
∗
1 {170 , 12.00} 0
2 {150 , 11.00} 0
3 {120 , 10.00} 40
4 {120 , 9.00} 120
5 {70 , 8.00} 70
The last internal offer at † that was cleared was β †3. A 1 MW increase in demand
will be met by clearing an additional 1 MW from the offer β †3 = {120 , 10}, hence
the marginal price of electricity at † for the ED problem defined in (4.1) is χ´ † = 10
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$/MWh.
While the CTS model solves (4.1) for IGOM , it simultaneously solves the exact
same ED problem for IGO F . The optimization variable of the ED problem for
IGO F is a´ ‡j, which represents the cleared real power in MW from the j
th submitted
internal offer for the ED problem described in this step. The ED problem for IGO F
is formulated in (4.2).
min
a´ ‡j
J∑
j=1
(a´ ‡j ) (µ
‡
j)
s.t.
J∑
j=1
a´ ‡j − d ‡ = 0 ←→ χ´ ‡
a´ ‡j − p ‡j ≤ 0 j = 1, 2, ...J
(4.2)
where d ‡ = 220 MW, and p ‡j and µ
‡
j of the respective internal offer j at ‡ are as listed
in Table 4.2, for j = 1, .., J and J = 6. The objective of the optimization problem
is to meet the demand d ‡ = 220 MW in the cheapest way from the internal offers
at ‡ that are listed in Table 4.2. By observation, we can solve (4.2) by clearing the
internal offers at Table 4.2 in the order of lowest to highest offer prices. Table 4.10
indicates the cleared internal offer amounts to meet the demand d ‡ = 220 MW.
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Table 4.10: Clearance of the internal offers at ‡ for CTS Step 1
j β ‡j = {p ‡j , µ ‡j} a´
‡
j
∗
1 {150 , 8.00} 150
2 {130 , 9.00} 70
3 {100 , 10.00} 0
4 {130 , 10.50} 0
5 {120 , 12.00} 0
6 {100 , 13.00} 0
The last internal offer at ‡ that was cleared was β ‡2. A 1 MW increase in demand will
be met by clearing an additional 1 MW from the offer β ‡2 = {130 , 9.00}, hence the
marginal price of electricity at ‡ for the ED problem defined in (4.2) is χ´ ‡ = 9.00
$/MWh. The CTS procedure allows the interface exchange to be only from the
bus with the lower marginal price to the bus with the higher marginal price. Since
χ´ ‡ = 9.00 $/MWh and χ´ † = 10.00 $/MWh, the interface exchange direction is from
the bus ‡ of IGO F to the bus † of IGOM .
CTS Step 2: Modification of the internal offers at †
The interface exchange direction that was determined in the previous step of CTS
designates how the internal offers at the bus † are modified by the interface offers.
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Since the interface exchange is from the bus ‡ of IGO F to the bus † of IGOM , the ‡
to † interface offers are used to modify the internal offers at †, and the † to ‡ interface
offers are not considered. Following our discussion in Section 3.3, we arrange the in-
ternal offers at † in descending order of their offer prices in Table 4.11. Further, we
arrange the ‡ to † interface offers in the ascending order of their price differences in
Table 4.12. We follow the substeps indicated in Section 3.3 and modify the internal
offers as follows:
β †1 = {170 , 12.00} is modified by β ‡→†1 = {20 , 0.75} to create β˜ †1 = {20, 11.25} and
β˜ †6 = {150, 12.00}.
β †2 = {150 , 11.00} is modified by β ‡→†2 = {30 , 1.00} to create β˜ †2 = {30, 10.00} and
β˜ †7 = {120, 11.00}.
β †3 = {120 , 10.00} is modified by β ‡→†3 = {40 , 1.25} to create β˜ †3 = {40, 8.75} and
β˜ †8 = {80, 10.00}.
β †4 = {120 , 9.00} is modified by β ‡→†4 = {30 , 1.50} to create β˜ †4 = {30, 7.50} and
β˜ †9 = {90, 9.00}.
β †5 = {70 , 8.00} is not modified because all four interface offers have been used to
modify the previous four internal offers at †. Hence, β˜ †5 = {70, 8.00}.
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Table 4.11: Internal offers at † arranged in descending order of offer prices
i β
†
i = {p †i , µ †i}
1 {170 , 12.00}
2 {150 , 11.00}
3 {120 , 10.00}
4 {120 , 9.00}
5 {70 , 8.00}
Table 4.12: ‡ to † interface offers arranged in ascending order of offered price differ-
ences
c β
‡→†
c = {p ‡→†c , µ ‡→†c }
1 {20 , 0.75}
2 {30 , 1.00}
3 {40 , 1.25}
4 {30 , 1.50}
CTS Step 3: Determination of the interface exchange amount
After the modified internal offers at †, {β˜ †}, are obtained in the previous step, we
follow the discussion in Section 3.4 and determine the interface exchange amount
as a by-product of the solution of yet another ED problem for the hypothetical ag-
gregation of the two interconnected IGOs as a single system based on the modified
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internal offers at † {β˜ †}, the internal offers ‡ {β ‡}, and the combined forecasted
intra-hour demands at † and ‡, d † + d ‡.
The ED problem for the hypothetically aggregated system can be formulated as
follows:
min
a˜ †
i˜
, a ‡j
I˜∑
i˜=1
(a˜ †
i˜
) (µ˜ †
i˜
) +
J∑
j=1
(a ‡j ) (µ
‡
j)
s.t.
I˜∑
i˜=1
a˜i˜ +
J∑
j=1
aj − (d¯ † + d¯ ‡) = 0 ←→ χ˜
a˜i˜ − p˜i˜ ≤ 0 i˜ = 1, 2, ...I˜
aj − pj ≤ 0 j = 1, 2, ...J
(4.3)
The optimal decision variables a˜ †
i˜
∗
i˜ = 1, 2, ...I˜ and a ‡j
∗
j = 1, 2, ...J indicate the
MW of power cleared from the internal offers i˜ = 1, 2, ...I˜ and j = 1, 2, ...J . In order
to illustrate the solution of the optimization problem (4.3), we form a table that con-
tains the modified internal offers at † {β˜ †} and the internal offers at ‡ {β ‡} arranged
in ascending order of their offer prices. Given that d † = 230MW and d ‡ = 220MW ,
we select the offers such that d † + d ‡ = 450MW is met from the cheapest 450MW
offers. Table 4.13 lists the cleared modified internal offer amounts at † and the
cleared internal offer amounts at ‡ to meet the demand d † + d ‡ = 450MW .
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The total power sold by the offerers at † can be represented by ∑I˜i˜=1 a˜ †i˜ ∗. From
Table 4.13, the total power sold by the internal offerers at † is 220MW . Similarly,
the total power sold by the internal offerers at ‡ can be represented as ∑Jj=1 a ‡j∗.
Also from Table 4.13, the total power sold by the internal offerers at ‡ is 230MW .
Plugging the values d † = 230MW , d ‡ = 220MW ,
∑I˜
i˜=1 a˜
†
i˜
∗
= 220MW , and∑J
j=1 a
‡
j
∗
= 230MW in (4.4) as explained in Section 3.3
J∑
j=1
a ‡j
∗
= d ‡ + f `
I˜∑
i˜=1
a˜ †
i˜
∗
+ f ` = d
†
(4.4)
we obtain f ` = 10MW .
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Table 4.13: Clearance of the modified internal offers at † and the internal offers at ‡
for the solution of (4.3)
β = {p , µ} a∗
β˜ †4 = {30 , 7.5} a˜
†
4
∗
= 30
β˜ †5 = {70 , 8} a˜
†
5
∗
= 70
β ‡1 = {150 , 8} a
‡
1
∗
= 150
β˜ †3 = {40 , 8.75} a˜
†
3
∗
= 40
β˜ †9 = {90 , 9} a˜
†
9
∗
= 80
β ‡2 = {130 , 9} a
‡
2
∗
= 80
β˜ †2 = {30 , 10} a˜
†
2
∗
= 0
β˜ †8 = {80 , 10} a˜
†
8
∗
= 0
β ‡3 = {100 , 10} a
‡
3
∗
= 0
β ‡4 = {130 , 10.5} a
‡
4
∗
= 0
β˜ †7 = {120 , 11} a˜
†
7
∗
= 0
β˜ †1 = {20 , 11.25} a˜
†
1
∗
= 0
β˜ †6 = {150 , 12} a˜
†
6
∗
= 0
β ‡5 = {120 , 12} a
‡
5
∗
= 0
β ‡6 = {100 , 13} a
‡
6
∗
= 0
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CTS Step 4: Clearance of the internal offers and the interface offers
In this step, the CTS model clears the original internal offers at † so that∑I˜i˜=1 a˜ †i˜ ∗ =
220MW is met in the most economical way. Table 4.14 lists the internal offers at †
and the cleared power amount from each offer in order to satisfy 220MW .
Table 4.14: Clearance of the original internal offers at † and ‡ by CTS
i β †i = {p †i , µ †i} a
†
i
∗
1 {170 , 12.00} 0
2 {150 , 11.00} 0
3 {120 , 10.00} 30
4 {120 , 9.00} 120
5 {70 , 8.00} 70
The last internal offer at † that gets cleared is β †3. A 1 MW increase in demand will
be met by clearing an additional 1 MW from the offer β †3 = {120 , 10}, hence the
marginal price of electricity at † is χ † = 10 $/MWh. Table 4.15 lists the internal
offers at ‡ and the cleared power from each offer in order to satisfy 230MW . The
last internal offer at ‡ that was cleared was β ‡2. A 1 MW increase in demand will
be met by clearing an additional 1 MW from the offer β ‡2 = {130 , 9}, hence the
marginal price of electricity at † is χ ‡ = 9 $/MWh.
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Following the discussion in Section 3.4, only the interface offers with price differ-
ences that are less than or equal to χ † - χ ‡ are cleared. Hence, β
‡→†
1 = {20 , 0.75}
and β ‡→†2 = {30 , 1.00} are cleared, and the interface offers β ‡→†3 = {40 , 1.25}
and β ‡→†4 = {30 , 1.50} are rejected. Finally, the total payments are obtained as
χ † ×
∑I
i=1 a
†
i + χ ‡ ×
∑J
j=1 a
‡
j=(10 × 220) + (9 × 230)=$ 4270.
Table 4.15: Clearance of the original internal offers at ‡ and ‡ by CTS
i β ‡j = {p ‡j , µ ‡j} a
‡
j
∗
1 {150 , 8} 150
2 {130 , 9} 80
3 {100 , 10} 0
4 {130 , 10.5} 0
5 {120 , 12} 0
6 {100 , 13} 0
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4.3 Illustrative Example 2
In this section, we use the Data Set 2 presented in Section 4.1 to demonstrate the
steps of the CTS as explained in Chapter 3. Similar to Section 4.1, the two intercon-
nected IGOs need to collect the required data/information, which serve as inputs to
the models that get accommodated in the CTS framework. The internal offers at
† that are listed in Table 4.5 and the intra-hour demand at † serve as inputs to the
IGOM internal market model in the economic layer, and the internal offers at ‡ that
are listed in Table 4.6 and the intra-hour demand at ‡ serve as inputs to the IGO F
internal market model in the economic layer. The † to ‡ interface offers in Table 4.7
and the ‡ to † interface offers in Table 4.8 are provided as inputs to the CTS model
in the economic layer.
The data/information need to be passed from the respective models to the CTS
model for the execution of CTS. The IGOM (IGO F ) internal market model passes
the internal offers at † (‡) and the intra-hour demand at † (‡) to the CTS model.
The required data/information are collected in the CTS model.
CTS Step 1: Determination of the interface exchange direction
The first step of CTS is the determination of the interface exchange direction. Sim-
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ilar to Section 4.2, the CTS model solves an ED problem for each IGO that does
not take into account the interface exchange. The optimization variable of the ED
problem for IGOM is a´ †i , which represents the cleared real power in MW from the
i th submitted internal offer at † for the ED problem described in this step. The ED
problem solved for IGOM , formulated in (4.1), is reprised here:
min
a´ †i
I∑
i=1
(a´ †i ) (µ
†
i )
s.t.
I∑
i=1
a´ †i − d † = 0 ←→ χ´ †
a´ †i − p †i ≤ 0 i = 1, 2, ...I
(4.5)
where d † = 150 MW, and p †i and µ
†
i of the respective internal offer i at † are listed
in Table 4.5, for i = 1, .., I and I = 4. The objective of the optimization problem
is to meet the demand d † = 150 MW in the cheapest way from the internal offers
at † that are listed in Table 4.5. By observation, we can solve (4.5) by clearing the
internal offers at Table 4.5 in the order of lowest to highest offer prices. Table 4.16
lists the cleared internal offer amounts to meet the demand d † = 150 MW.
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Table 4.16: Clearance of the internal offers at † for CTS Step 1
i β †i = {p †i , µ †i} a´
†
i
∗
4 {60 , 8.00} 60
3 {200 , 9.00} 90
2 {140 , 10.00} 0
1 {130 , 11.00} 0
The last internal offer at † that was cleared was β †2. A 1 MW increase in demand
will be met by clearing an additional 1 MW from the offer β †2 = {200 , 9}, hence
the marginal price of electricity at † for the ED problem defined in (4.5) is χ´ † = 9
$/MWh.
While the CTS model solves the ED problem (4.5) for IGOM , it simultaneously
solves the exact same problem for IGO F . The optimization variable of the ED
problem for IGO F is a´ ‡j, which represents the cleared real power in MW from the
j th submitted internal offer for the ED problem described in this step. The ED
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problem is formulated as follows:
min
a´ ‡j
J∑
j=1
(a´ ‡j ) (µ
‡
j)
s.t.
J∑
j=1
a´ ‡j − d ‡ = 0 ←→ χ´ †
a´ ‡j − p ‡j ≤ 0 j = 1, 2, ...J
(4.6)
where d ‡ = 270 MW, and p ‡j and µ
‡
j of the respective internal offer j at ‡ are listed
in Table 4.6, for j = 1, .., J and J = 5.
The objective of the optimization problem is to meet the demand d ‡ = 270 MW
in the cheapest way from the internal offers at ‡ that are listed in Table 4.6. By ob-
servation, we can solve (4.6) by clearing the internal offers at Table 4.6 in the order
of lowest to highest offer prices. Table 4.17 lists the cleared internal offer amounts
to meet the demand d ‡ = 270 MW.
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Table 4.17: Clearance of the internal offers at ‡ for CTS Step 1
j β ‡j = {p ‡j , µ ‡j} a´
‡
j
∗
1 {80 , 8} 80
2 {90 , 9} 90
3 {110 , 10} 100
4 {140 , 11} 0
5 {100 , 12} 0
The last internal offer at ‡ that was cleared was β ‡3. A 1 MW increase in demand
will be met by clearing an additional MW from the offer β ‡3 = {110 , 10}, hence
the marginal price of electricity at ‡ for the ED problem defined in (4.6) is χ´ ‡ = 10
$/MWh.
The CTS procedure allows the interface exchange to be only from the bus with
the lower marginal price to the bus with the higher marginal price. Since χ´ ‡ = 10
$/MWh and χ´ † = 9 $/MWh, the interface exchange direction is from the bus † of
IGOM to the bus ‡ of IGO F .
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CTS Step 2: Modification of the internal offers at †
The interface exchange direction that was determined in the previous step of CTS
designates how the internal offers at the bus † are modified by the interface offers.
Since the interface exchange is from the bus † of IGOM to the bus ‡ of IGO F ,
the † to ‡ interface offers are used to modify the internal offers at †, and the ‡ to
† interface offers are not considered. Following our discussion in Section 3.3, we
arrange the internal offers at † in descending order of their offer prices in Table 4.18.
Further, we arrange the † to ‡ interface offers in the ascending order of their price
differences in Table 4.19.
Table 4.18: Internal offers at † arranged in descending order of offer prices
i β
†
i = {p †i , µ †i}
1 {130 , 11.00}
2 {140 , 10.00}
3 {200 , 9.00}
4 {60 , 8.00}
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Table 4.19: † to ‡ interface offers arranged in ascending order of offered price differ-
ences
n β
†→‡
n = {p †→‡n , µ †→‡n }
1 {30 , 0.50}
2 {50 , 0.75}
3 {40 , 1.25}
4 {30 , 1.50}
5 {40 , 1.75}
We follow the substeps provided in Section 3.3 and modify the internal offers as
follows:
β †1 = {130 , 11.00} is modified by β †→‡1 = {30 , 0.50} to create β˜ †1 = {30, 11.50} and
β˜ †5 = {100, 11.00}.
β †2 = {140 , 10.00} is modified by β †→‡2 = {50 , 0.75} to create β˜ †2 = {50, 10.75} and
β˜ †6 = {90, 10.00}.
β †3 = {200 , 9.00} is modified by β ‡→†3 = {40 , 1.25} to create β˜ †3 = {40, 10.25} and
β˜ †7 = {160, 9.00}.
β †4 = {60 , 8.00} is modified by β ‡→†4 = {30 , 1.50} to create β˜ †4 = {30, 9.50} and
β˜ †8 = {30, 8.00}.
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CTS Step 3: Determination of the interface exchange amount
After the modified internal offers at †, {β˜ †}, are obtained in the previous step, we
follow the discussion in Section 3.4 and determine the interface exchange amount
as a by-product of the solution of yet another ED problem for the hypothetical ag-
gregation of the two interconnected IGOs as a single system based on the modified
internal offers at † {β˜ †}, the internal offers ‡ {β ‡}, and the combined forecasted
intra-hour demands at † and ‡, d † + d ‡.
The ED problem for the fictitiously aggregated system is formulated in (4.7).
min
a˜ †
i˜
, a ‡j
I˜∑
i˜=1
(a˜ †
i˜
) (µ˜ †
i˜
) +
J∑
j=1
(a ‡j ) (µ
‡
j)
s.t.
I˜∑
i˜=1
a˜i˜ +
J∑
j=1
aj − (d¯ † + d¯ ‡) = 0 ←→ χ˜
a˜i˜ − p˜i˜ ≤ 0 i˜ = 1, 2, ...I˜
aj − pj ≤ 0 j = 1, 2, ...J
(4.7)
The optimal decision variables a˜ †
i˜
∗
i˜ = 1, 2, ...I˜ and a ‡j
∗
j = 1, 2, ...J indicate the
MW of power cleared from the internal offers i˜ = 1, 2, ...I˜ and j = 1, 2, ...J . In order
to illustrate the solution of the optimization problem (4.7), we form a table that con-
tains the modified internal offers at † {β˜ †} and the internal offers at ‡ {β ‡} arranged
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in ascending order of their offer prices. Given that d † = 150MW and d ‡ = 270MW ,
we select the offers such that d † + d ‡ = 420MW is met from the cheapest 420MW
offers. Table 4.20 lists the cleared modified internal offer amounts at † and the
cleared internal offer amounts at ‡ to meet the demand d † + d ‡ = 420MW .
The total power sold by the offerers at † can be represented by ∑I˜i˜=1 a˜ †i˜ ∗. From
Table 20, the total power sold by the internal offerers at † is 235MW . Similarly, the
total power sold by the internal offerers at ‡ can be represented as ∑Jj=1 a ‡j∗. Also
from Table 20, the total power sold by the internal offerers at ‡ is 185MW .
Plugging the values d † = 150MW , d ‡ = 270MW ,
∑I˜
i˜=1 a˜
†
i˜
∗
= 235MW , and∑J
j=1 a
‡
j
∗
= 185MW in (4.8) as explained in Section 3.3,
J∑
j=1
a ‡j
∗
= d ‡ + f `
I˜∑
i˜=1
a˜ †
i˜
∗
+ f ` = d
†
(4.8)
we obtain f ` = −85MW .
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Table 4.20: Clearance of the modified internal offers at † and the internal offers at ‡
for the solution of (4.3)
β = {p , µ} a
β ‡1 = {80 , 8.00} a
‡
1 = 80
β˜ †8 = {30 , 8.00} a˜
†
8 = 30
β ‡2 = {90 , 9.00} a
‡
2 = 90
β˜ †7 = {160 , 9.00} a˜
†
7 = 160
β˜ †4 = {30 , 9.50} a˜
†
4 = 30
β ‡3 = {110 , 10.00} a
‡
3 = 15
β˜ †6 = {90 , 10.00} a˜
†
6 = 15
β˜ †3 = {40 , 10.25} a˜
†
3 = 0
β˜ †2 = {50 , 10.75} a˜
†
2 = 0
β ‡4 = {140 , 11.00} a
‡
4 = 0
β˜ †5 = {100 , 11.00} a˜
†
5 = 0
β˜ †1 = {30 , 11.50} a˜
†
1 = 0
β ‡5 = {100 , 12} a
‡
5 = 0
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CTS Step 4: Clearance of the internal offers and the interface offers
In this step, the CTS model clears the original internal offers at † so that∑I˜i˜=1 a˜ †i˜ ∗ =
235MW is met in the most economical way. Table 4.21 provides the internal offers
at † and the cleared power amount from each offer in order to satisfy 235MW .
Table 4.21: Clearance of the original internal offers at † and ‡ by CTS
i β †i = {p †i , µ †i} a´
†
i
4 {60 , 8.00} 60
3 {200 , 9.00} 175
2 {140 , 10.00} 0
1 {130 , 11.00} 0
The last internal offer at † that gets cleared is β †3. A 1 MW increase in demand will
be met by clearing an additional 1 MW from the offer β †3 = {200 , 9.00}, hence the
marginal price of electricity at † is χ † = 9 $/MWh.
In addition, Table 4.22 provides the internal offers at ‡ and the cleared power amount
from each offer in order to satisfy 185MW . The last internal offer at ‡ that is cleared
in Table 4.22 is β ‡3. A 1 MW increase in demand will be met by clearing an addi-
tional 1 MW from the offer β ‡3 = {110 , 10}, hence the marginal price of electricity
at † is χ ‡ = 10 $/MWh.
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Following the discussion in Section 3.4, only the interface offers with price differences
less than or equal to χ ‡ - χ † = 1 $/MWh are cleared. Hence, β
†→‡
1 = {30 , 0.50}
and β †→‡2 = {50 , 0.75} are cleared, and the interface offers β †→‡3 = {40 , 1.25},
β †→‡4 = {30 , 1.50}, and β †→‡4 = {40 , 1.75} are rejected. Finally, the total pay-
ments are obtained as (χ † ×
∑I
i=1 a
†
i ) + (χ ‡ ×
∑J
j=1 a
‡
j)=(9 × 235) + (10 × 185)=
$ 3965.
Table 4.22: Clearance of the original internal offers at ‡ and ‡ by CTS
j β ‡j = {p ‡j , µ ‡j} a´
†
j
1 {80 , 8} 80
2 {90 , 9} 90
3 {110 , 10} 15
4 {140 , 11} 0
5 {100 , 12} 0
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4.4 Sensitivity Analyses
In the previous two sections, we have illustrated the execution of CTS with two
different data sets. In this section, we conduct various sensitivity analyses, and eval-
uate the dependence of the interface flow and the total payments on a change in
submitted internal or interface offers.
Change in the internal offer β †5 of Data Set 1
In order to illustrate the dependence of the interface flow and the total payments
on a change in a submitted internal offer, we change a submitted internal offer in
Data Set 1 and repeat Illustrative Example 1. We change the submitted internal
offer β †5 = {70 , 8.00} of Data Set 1 to β †5 = {120 , 8.00}, and repeat the execution of
CTS with the new set of submitted internal offers. The first step of CTS, as demon-
strated in Section 4.2, is the determination of the interface exchange direction. In
order to do that, each side solved an ED problem without considering the interface
exchange, and obtained the marginal price of electricity. We have seen in Illustrative
Example 1 that χ´ ‡ was obtained as 10 $/MWh. The change in the submitted internal
offer β †5 of Data Set 1 to β
†
5 = {120 , 8.00} may result in a change in χ´ †. In order to
observe that, we solve (4.1) again with the new set of submitted internal offers. We
clear the new set of internal offers at † in the order of lowest to highest offer prices
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so as to meet the demand d † = 230MW . Table 4.23 lists the clearance of the new
set of internal offers at † for the ED problem defined in (4.1).
Table 4.23: Clearance of the new set of internal offers at † for CTS Step 1 for
β †5 = {70 , 8.00}
i β †i = {p †i , µ †i} a´
†
i
∗
1 {170 , 12.00} 0
2 {150 , 11.00} 0
3 {120 , 10.00} 0
4 {120 , 9.00} 110
5 {120 , 8.00} 120
The last internal offer at † that was cleared is now β †4. A 1 MW increase in de-
mand will be met by clearing an additional 1 MW from the offer β †4 = {120 , 9},
hence the marginal price of electricity at † is now χ´ † = 9 $/MWh whereas it used
to be 10 $/MWh. Since χ´ ‡ = 9 $/MWh as well, the marginal prices of electric-
ity on both sides of the interface are the same, and there will not be an interface
exchange in CTS, whereas f ` was 10MW before the change of internal offer β
†
5.
Hence, no interface offers will be accepted. The total payments are now obtained as
(χ † ×
∑I
i=1 a
†
i
∗
) + (χ ‡ ×
∑J
j=1 a
‡
j
∗
)=(9 × 230) + (9 × 220)=$ 4050.
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Change in the interface offer β ‡→†4 of Data Set 1
We also observe the dependence of the interface flow and the total payments on a
change in the submitted interface offers. We change the submitted interface offer
β ‡→†4 = {30 , 1.50} to β ‡→†4 = {50 , 1.50}, which indicates that the interface of-
ferer is willing to transact more power for the same price difference between the
two busses. When the interface offer is modified as such, the modification on the
internal offer at † will be different, and β †4 = {120 , 9.00} will instead be modified by
β ‡→†4 = {50 , 1.50} to create β˜ †4 = {50, 7.50} and β˜ †9 = {70, 9.00}. Such a change in
the modified internal offers will influence CTS Step 3, as (4.3) will be solved with
the new set of modified internal offers. Table 4.24 indicates the cleared modified
internal offer amounts at † created by β ‡→†4 = {50 , 1.50} and the cleared internal
offer amounts at ‡ to meet the demand d † + d ‡ = 450MW .
The total power sold by the offerers at † can be represented by ∑I˜i˜=1 a˜ †i˜ . From Table
4.24, the total power sold by the internal offerers at † is 230MW . Similarly, the total
power sold by the internal offerers at ‡ can be represented by ∑Jj=1 a ‡j. Also from
Table 4.24, the total power sold by the internal offerers at ‡ is 220MW . Plugging the
values d † = 230MW , d ‡ = 220MW ,
∑I˜
i˜=1 a˜
†
i˜
= 220MW , and
∑J
j=1 a
‡
j = 230MW
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in (4.9)as explained in Section 3.3
J∑
j=1
a ‡j
∗
= d ‡ + f `
I˜∑
i˜=1
a˜ †
i˜
∗
+ f ` = d
†
(4.9)
we obtain f ` = 0MW , where f ` used to be 10MW before the change of the interface
offer.
When CTS Step 4 is executed, the total power sold by the internal offerers at †
230MW will be cleared from the original internal offers at † in the order of lowest
to highest offer prices. Table 4.25 lists the internal offers at † and the cleared power
amount from each offer in order to satisfy 230MW in the most economical way. From
Table 4.25, the last internal offer at † that gets cleared is β †3. A 1 MW increase in
demand will be met by clearing an additional 1 MW from the offer β †3 = {120 , 10},
hence the marginal price of electricity at † is χ † = 10 $/MWh.
Table 4.26 lists the internal offers at ‡ and the cleared power from each offer in order
to satisfy 220MW . From Table 4.26, the last internal offer at ‡ that was cleared was
β ‡2. A 1 MW increase in demand will be met by clearing an additional 1 MW from
85
the offer β ‡2 = {130 , 9}, hence the marginal price of electricity at † is χ ‡ = 9 $/MWh.
Following the discussion in Section 3.4, only the interface offers with price differ-
ences less than or equal to χ † - χ ‡ are cleared. Since the price difference between the
two busses remained the same after the change in β ‡→†4 , the same interface offers
are cleared. Hence, β ‡→†1 = {20 , 0.75} and β ‡→†2 = {30 , 1.00} are cleared, and the
interface offers β ‡→†3 = {40 , 1.25} and β ‡→†4 = {30 , 1.50} are rejected. Finally, the
total payments are obtained as χ † ×
∑I
i=1 a
†
i + χ ‡ ×
∑J
j=1 a
‡
j=(10 × 230) + (9 ×
220)=$ 4280. Before the change in the interface offer β ‡→†4 , the total payments were
obtained as $ 4270, hence when the submitted interface offer β ‡→†4 = {30 , 1.50} is
changed to β ‡→†4 = {50 , 1.50}, the total payments increased from $ 4270 to $ 4280.
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Table 4.24: Clearance of the modified internal offers at † and the internal offers at ‡
for the solution of (4.3) for β ‡→†4 = {50 , 1.50}
β = {p , µ} a∗
β˜ †4 = {50 , 7.5} a˜
†
4 = 50
β˜ †5 = {70 , 8} a˜
†
5 = 70
β ‡1 = {150 , 8} a
‡
1 = 150
β˜ †3 = {40 , 8.75} a˜
†
3 = 40
β˜ †9 = {70 , 9} a˜
†
9 = 70
β ‡2 = {130 , 9} a
‡
2 = 70
β˜ †2 = {30 , 10} a˜
†
2 = 0
β˜ †8 = {80 , 10} a˜
†
8 = 0
β ‡3 = {100 , 10} a
‡
3 = 0
β ‡4 = {130 , 10.5} a
‡
4 = 0
β˜ †7 = {120 , 11} a˜
†
7 = 0
β˜ †1 = {20 , 11.25} a˜
†
1 = 0
β˜ †6 = {150 , 12} a˜
†
6 = 0
β ‡5 = {120 , 12} a
‡
5 = 0
β ‡6 = {100 , 13} a
‡
6 = 0
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Table 4.25: Clearance of the original internal offers at † by CTS for β ‡→†4 =
{50 , 1.50}
i β †i = {p †i , µ †i} a
†
i
∗
1 {170 , 12.00} 0
2 {150 , 11.00} 0
3 {120 , 10.00} 40
4 {120 , 9.00} 120
5 {70 , 8.00} 70
Table 4.26: Clearance of the original internal offers at ‡ by CTS for β ‡→†4 =
{50 , 1.50}
i β ‡j = {p ‡j , µ ‡j} a
‡
j
∗
1 {150 , 8} 150
2 {130 , 9} 70
3 {100 , 10} 0
4 {130 , 10.5} 0
5 {120 , 12} 0
6 {100 , 13} 0
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4.5 Concluding Remarks and Summary
In this chapter, we have illustrated the execution of CTS, and run a sensitivity anal-
ysis to observe the dependence of the interface exchange and the total payments on a
change in internal or interface offers. We have illustrated the execution of CTS with
two data sets. In Section 4.2, we have observed that, without any use of the inter-
face, the total payments were calculated as $ 4280. When the coordination procedure
CTS was used for the interchange exchange determination, we obtained the interface
exchange as f ` = 10MW and the total payments as $ 4270, which showed that CTS
was able to decrease the total payments. We have also observed the sensitivity of the
internal offer and the interface offer to the interface exchange and the total payments.
We have observed that an increase in the offered power amount of an internal offer
at † decreased the need to transact power from ‡, hence the interface exchange de-
creased. Furthermore, such a change also decreased the total payments obtained via
CTS from $ 4270 to $ 4050.
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CHAPTER 5
TOWARD SHORTHER COORDINATION
PERIODS
The discussion of CTS in Chapter 3 showed that a key consideration in the execution
of CTS is time. Since CTS includes steps that must be jointly executed by the two
IGOs, it is required to have a thorough description of the instants by which each
step must be executed, as well as the instants by which the necessary data/informa-
tion must be shared, so that the two IGOs can coordinate the execution of CTS.
Furthermore, CTS relies on the demand forecast and the submitted internal and
interface offers to determine the interchange evaluation. Based on forecasting expe-
rience, we know that the variation of a forecast error increases with time. As such, it
is desired to reduce the duration of the coordination period, so that the CTS yields
an interface flow that is close to the interface flow that would have been obtained,
had the actual values been used. The CTS determines the interface flow for the coor-
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dination period [k]
∣∣
h
, and the determined interface flow remains constant during the
entire coordination period. The real-time markets of the two interconnected IGOs,
on the other hand, may have shorter durations. Our analysis of CTS in Chapter
3 made it clear that the interface flow determined for the coordination period [k]
∣∣
h
is from the bus with the lower marginal price to the bus with the higher marginal
price—which is the intuitive interface flow direction. However, if the duration of
the real-time markets is shorter than the duration of the coordination period [k]
∣∣
h
,
then the determined interface flow may be from the bus with the higher marginal
price to the bus with the lower marginal price for certain real-time market periods—
which is a counter-intuitive interface flow direction. Hence, we are interested in
observing the influence of the duration of the coordination periods on the number
of real-time market periods during which we observe counter-intuitive interface flows.
In order to perform the analysis on the time issues of CTS, we focus on the co-
ordination period [k]
∣∣
h
, and reprise our time convention discussed in Section 2.1.
For a given day, we express all time elements in minutes (m) and a time element τ
denotes the cumulative minutes elapsed from the start of the day, at 0 min. The
term h is the index for the hourly periods of a day such that h = 1, 2, ..., 24. We
define the hourly period as Th , {τ : (h− 1)(60) < τ ≤ (h)(60)}.
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We consider K intra-hourly subperiods of equal duration for each hour h, and in-
troduce the index k for the intra-hourly subperiods such that k = 1, 2, ..., K. We
denote the duration of each intra-hourly subperiod by ζ. We define the inta-hourly
subperiod as T
[k]
∣∣
h
, {τ : (h− 1)(60) + (k − 1)(ζ) < τ ≤ (h− 1)(60) + (k)(ζ)}. The
time frame of our analysis is illustrated in Figure 5.1.
In Section 5.1 we focus on the duration of the procedural steps on CTS, and dis-
cuss the instants at which each step must be completed. In Section 5.2, we examine
the influence of decreasing coordination period durations on the performance of the
demand forecasts. In Section 5.3, we utilize the real-time prices at the Sandy Pond
bus, which is the NY ISO’s proxy bus for ISO-NE, and the Roseton bus, which is
the ISO-NE’s proxy bus for NY ISO, to analyze the influence of the coordination
period durations on the number of real-time market periods at which we observe
counter-intuitive interface flows. Finally, we provide the concluding remarks and the
summary of the chapter in Section 5.4.
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Figure 5.1: Time scale of the framework
5.1 Duration of the Procedural Steps of CTS
The discussion on CTS in Chapter 3 provided a detailed description of the steps
that must be completed for the execution of CTS. In this section, we will specify
the time instants by which these steps must be completed, as well as the factors that
influence the duration of these steps.
Before the two interconnected IGOs can start CTS, they need to collect the neces-
sary data/information, which are explained in detail in Section 3.1. We denote the
time instant by which the necessary data/information must be collected by τ p which
depends on the internal mechanisms by which each IGO collects data/information
from its system. The collected data/information include the intra-hour demand, in-
ternal offers, interface offers, and the data/information about the generators in that
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system. Each IGO may designate a different point in time as the deadline to col-
lect these data/information from their individual system; however, they must jointly
agree on τ p as the time instant by which all the required data/information must be
collected in order to start CTS.
The first step of CTS is the determination of the interface flow direction. The
discussion in Section 3.2 shows that, in order to determine the interface flow di-
rection, an ED problem is solved based on the internal offers and the intra-hour
demands of each system without the utilization of the interface. The interface flow
direction is determined to be from the bus with lower marginal price of electricity
to the bus with higher marginal price of electricity. We denote the time instant by
which the interface flow direction must be determined by τ d. Time instant τ d is
predominantly influenced by the execution time of the software deployed to solve
the ED problem in the two IGOs, and the software with the larger execution time
determines τ d. The execution time of the software may be influenced by the time it
takes to input/output data to/from the software, the algorithm used by the software
to solve the ED, and the number of the internal offers of the IGO.
In the second step of CTS, the internal offers at † are modified by the interface
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offers. The discussion in Section 3.3 explains the cases, as well as the substeps, that
must be executed for each case to modify the internal offers at †. We denote the
time instant by which the internal offers at † are modified by τm. Time instant τm
depends on the execution time of the software that the CTS model of the framework
deploys to modify the internal offers at †. The execution time of the software to mod-
ify the internal offers at † may be influenced by the time it takes to input/output
data to/from the software, the number of the internal offers at †, and the number of
interface offers.
Once the internal offers at † are modified, in Step 3, the CTS model solves an
ED problem based on the modified internal offers at †, internal offers at ‡, and the
aggregate intra-hour demands at † and ‡. The discussion in Section 3.4 shows that
the solution of this ED problem yields the interface flow amount. We denote the
time instant by which the ED problem in Step 3 must be solved and the interface
flow amount must be determined by τ t. Time instant τ t is determined by the ex-
ecution time of the software to solve the ED problem of this step. The execution
time of the software may be influenced by the time it takes to input/output data
to/from the software, the algorithm used by the CTS model to solve the ED defined
in Step 3, and the number of the modified internal offers at † and the internal offers ‡.
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In Step 4, the CTS model solves another ED problem for each system based on
the original internal offers and the intra-hour demands at the bus of each system,
and the interface flow that was determined in the previous step. These ED problems
determine the cleared internal offers and the marginal price of electricity at each bus.
Based on the difference between the marginal prices of electricity at the two busses,
the interface offers are also cleared. We denote the time instant by which the internal
offers and the interface offers are cleared by τ a, which is determined by the execution
time of the software used to solve the ED problems in this step. The execution time
of the software may be influenced by the time it takes to input/output data to/from
the software, the algorithm used to solve the ED problems in this step, the number
of the internal offers at † and ‡, and the number of the interface offers.
The analysis in this section shows the significance of the consideration of time in
the execution of CTS. In order for the two IGOs to perform CTS in a coordi-
nated way, both IGOs must abide by the time instances by which each step must
be completed, as an untimely completion of a step by one IGO may interrupt the
performance of CTS. Furthermore, the completion time of each step depends on
various factors, and in order to shorten the duration of the coordination period, the
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two IGOs must work on the factors that influence the duration of each step of CTS.
5.2 Influence of the Coordination Period Durations
on the Demand Forecast Performance
CTS relies on the collected internal offers, interface offers and the forecasted intra-
hour demands to determine the interchange evaluation. We have denoted the time
instant by which the necessary data/information must be collected by τ p. Some of
the collected internal and interface offers that were submitted at τ p may not be able
to deliver and transact the power that they promised at (h − 1)(60) + kζ, which is
the beginning of the coordination period. Furthermore, the intra-hour demands that
were forecasted at τ p may differ from the actual demands observed at (h−1)(60)+kζ.
Our forecasting experience shows that the forecast error increases with time. Hence,
it is in our interest to work with shorter coordination periods, so that the interchange
evaluation determined with the forecasted intra-hour demands will be closer to the
value that would have been obtained, had the actual intra-hour demands been used
for the determination of interchange evaluation.
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In order to examine the influence of shorter coordination periods on the perfor-
mance of the demand forecast, we consider two cases. In Case 1, we consider that
each 5 min decrease in the duration of the coordination period increases the demand
forecast performance by 3%. In Case 2, we consider that each 5 min decrease in
the duration of the coordination period increases the demand forecast performance
by 5%. In Figure 5.2, we plot the performance of the demand forecasts vs. different
coordination periods for the two cases.
As expected, the plots in both cases show that as the coordination period gets
shorter, the demand forecast performance increases. The demand forecast perfor-
mance in Case 1 ranges between 97.1% and 83.7% as the coordination period dura-
tion ranges between 5 min and 30 min. The demand forecast performance in Case
2 ranges between 95.2% and 74.6% as the coordination period duration ranges be-
tween 5 min and 30 min. Since the duration of the real-time markets is generally 5
min, we select the duration of the coordination periods in our analysis so that it is
an integer multiple of the duration of the real-time markets, i.e. 5 min. Figure 5.2
shows that in order to attain a 95% demand forecast performance, the coordination
period durations in both cases must be 5 min or less. If it is desired to attain at
least 90% demand forecast performance, then coordination period duration can be
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Figure 5.2: Demand forecast performance vs. coordination period duration
selected as 15 min for Case 1; however, the coordination period duration cannot be
longer than 10 min for Case 2.
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5.3 Influence of the Coordination Period Durations
on the Counter-Intuitive Flows
The discussion of CTS in Chapter 3 has shown us that the interface flow is eval-
uated for the coordination period [k]
∣∣
h
that has a duration of ζ. The direction of
the interface flow is determined so that it is from the bus at which the marginal
price of electricity is lower to the bus at which the marginal price of electricity is
higher—which is the intuitive interface flow direction—and the determined direction
and the amount of the interface flow remain constant during the coordination period
[k]
∣∣
h
. However, this determination of the interface flow direction is based on the
assumption that the marginal prices of electricity remain constant during the coor-
dination period [k]
∣∣
h
. We know that the real-time prices of electricity are determined
in real-time markets, which in general have a duration of 5 min. If ζ is larger than
the duration of the real-time market period, there may be real-time market periods
at which the direction of the interface flow is counter-intuitive — from the bus at
which the marginal price of electricity is higher to the bus at which the marginal
price of electricity is lower. We anticipate that as ζ approaches the duration of the
real-time market, we will observe fewer real-time market periods at which the inter-
face flow direction is counter-intuitive, and that as ζ gets larger, we will observe more
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real-time market periods at which the interface flow direction is counter-intuitive.
In order to simulate the influence of the duration of coordination periods on the
number of real-time market periods at which we observe counter-intuitive flows, we
utilize the data on the real-time prices at the Sandy Pond bus of ISO-NE, and the
Roseton bus of NY ISO for March 31, 2018. The real-time market duration is 5
min, and there are 288 real-time market periods in the selected day. We determine
the direction of the interface flow for longer coordination periods by downsampling
the real-time market price data. Namely, in order to observe the intra-hour market
duration of 10 min, we downsample the real-time market price data by 2; in order
to observe the intra-hour market duration of 15 min, we downsample the real-time
market price data by 3; and in order to observe the intra-hour market duration of 30
min, we downsample the real-time market price data by 6. For each of these longer
intra-hour market periods, we determine the direction of the interface flow based on
the marginal prices at the busses of the samples. For instance, for a coordination
period of 30 min, in order to determine the direction of the interface flow for the
first 30 min of March 31, 2018, we compare the first real-time price data of the two
busses. Then, we set the direction of the interface flow for the first 30 min so that
it is from the bus with the lower marginal price to the bus with the higher marginal
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price of the first real-time price time data at the two busses. When we compare
the first real-time market price data with the other 5 real-time market price data
of the first coordination period, we may observe that the determined interface flow
direction is from the bus with the higher marginal price for the real-time market to
the bus with the lower marginal price for the real-time market—which is detrimental
to the goal of the utilization of the interface.
In Figure 5.3, we provide the number of the real-time market periods at which the
interface flow direction is counter-intuitive vs. the coordination period duration for
March 30, 2018 between the Sandy Pond bus of ISO-NE, and the Roseton bus of
NY ISO.
We observe that as the coordination period duration increases, the number of real-
time market periods at which the interface flow direction is counter-intuitive increases
as well. Namely, when the coordination period duration is selected as 10 min, we
observe 20 real-time market periods at which the direction of the interface flow is
counter-intuitive. When the coordination period duration is selected as 15 min, we
observe 32 real-time market periods at which the direction of the interface flow is
counter-intuitive, and when the coordination period duration is selected as 30 min,
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we observe 41 real-time market periods at which the direction of the interface flow
is counter-intuitive. Such an increase in the number of real-time market periods at
which we observe counter-intuitive interface flow directions shows the significance of
decreasing the coordination period durations. In order to utilize the interface flow so
as to meet the demand with lower marginal price of electricity, it makes sense to de-
crease the coordination period durations. Hence, the ideal case for the coordination
period duration would be to make it equal to the duration of the real-time markets.
When the coordination period duration is equal to the real-time market duration,
we can ensure that the interface flow directions are always intuitive at all real-time
market periods under perfect information.
5.4 Concluding Remarks and Summary
In this chapter, we have examined the time issues of CTS. The interchange evalu-
ation is determined jointly by the two IGOs and the two IGOs must decide on the
time instances by which each step must be executed in order to perform CTS. We
have stipulated the time instances by which each step of CTS must be executed,
and identified the factors that influence the duration of the steps.
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Figure 5.3: Number of the real-time market periods at which the interface flow
direction is counter-intuitive vs. the coordination period duration
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The interchange evaluation is determined using the demand forecasts and internal
and interface offers, which are obtained a certain amount of time before CTS is
executed. We anticipated that as the forecast gets closer in time, the performance of
a forecast will increase. Hence, we have observed the influence of the duration of the
coordination periods on the demand forecast performance for two cases, and eval-
uated the demand forecast performance for the coordination period durations of 5
min, 10 min, 15 min, and 30 min. We have observed that in both cases the demand
forecast performance increases as the coordination period gets shorter. Further, in
both cases, we have observed that a 5 min coordination period yields more than 95%
of demand forecast performance.
We have also observed the influence of the duration of the coordination period on
the number of real-time market periods at which counter-intuitive interface flows are
observed. We have considered the real-time prices in the Sandy Pond and Roseton
busses, and downsampled the real-time market data to determine the interface flow
directions for longer coordination periods. We have observed that as the duration of
the coordination period increases, the number of real-time market periods at which
the interface flow is counter-intuitive increases as well. We conclude that the ideal
would be to make the coordination period duration equal to the real-time market du-
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ration, which will theoretically ensure intuitive interface flow directions under perfect
information at all real-time market periods.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS
In this thesis, we focus on the analysis and the quantification of the performance of
CTS. In order to accommodate all the required models and tools for the analysis and
the quantification of a coordination scheme, we construct a two-layered framework.
The two salient characteristics of the framework are generality and comprehensive-
ness. Since the framework is general, it allows the analysis and quantification of the
performance of any coordination scheme, and the accommodation of any particular
choice of model. The framework is comprehensive, as it takes into account all the
physical and economic aspects of a coordination scheme.
We tailor the framework for CTS, and develop appropriate physical and economic
models. We have identified the sharing of data/information as a key issue in the
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execution of a coordination scheme. We represent the sharing of data/information
between the IGOs by the interactions between the models of the framework. In
order to ensure that the data/information are shared only with intended parties, we
design the interactions between the models according to the sharing specifications
of data/information. We use the framework to discuss the procedural steps of CTS.
We provide an analytical underpinning of the procedural steps of CTS and formulate
the required tasks. The incorporation of interface offers in CTS enables the IGOs
to harness market forces for the determination of interchange evaluation. Our dis-
cussion of the procedural steps of CTS showed that the modification of the internal
offers by the interface offers acts as a barrier to the interface offerer that wishes to
take advantage of the marginal electricity price difference between the two systems.
These modifications also cause the total payments obtained via CTS to be higher
than or equal to the total payments obtained via TLO.
We illustrate the performance of each procedural step of CTS using two data sets.
Our results show that the total payment obtained via CTS is lower than the total
payment that would have been obtained, had the two IGOs not utilized any inter-
change. We also conduct sensitivity analyses and evaluate the dependence of total
payment and interface exchange amount on a change in internal or interface offers.
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We observed that an increase in the offered transaction amount of an interface offer
decreased the interface exchange amount. We also observed, that a change in an
internal offer influenced the marginal price of electricity at a bus, and consequently
influenced the interface exchange amount.
We assessed the elapsed time durations of the procedural steps of CTS and identi-
fied the limiting constraints, so as to work toward shorter coordination periods. We
identified the limiting constraint on the time it takes to execute most procedural
steps as the speed of the software in executing the respective tasks of the steps.
We studied the dependence of the demand forecast performance on the coordina-
tion period duration, and simulated the demand forecast performance for different
coordination period durations. We investigated the impact of coordination period
durations on the number of real-time market periods in which the interface exchange
is counter-intuitive. The duration of the real-time markets is generally shorter than
the coordination period. When an interchange exchange amount is determined, it
holds for all the real-time market periods within the coordination period. Hence, as
the coordination period duration increases, it becomes more difficult to capture the
prices at the real-time market periods within the coordination period. We run a sim-
ulation using actual real-time market prices in Sandy Pond and Roseton busses. The
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simulation results show that the number of real-time market periods during which
interface exchange is counter-intuitive increases as the coordination period duration
increases. Hence, it makes sense for the IGOs of the interconnected power systems
to focus on the limiting constraints on the duration of the procedural steps of CTS,
and strive to shorten the coordination periods.
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APPENDIX A
NOTATION
For any given day, all time elements are expressed in minutes (min). An element τ
denotes the cumulative minutes elapsed from the start of the day at 0 min.
h index of each hour of a day, h = 1, 2, ...24
[k]
∣∣
h
index of an intra-hour subperiod of hour h, k = 1, 2, ...K
Th , {τ : (h− 1)(60) < τ ≤ (h)(60)}
ζ duration of each intra-hour subperiod [k]
∣∣
h
T
[k]
∣∣
h
, {τ : (h− 1)(60) + (k − 1)(ζ) < τ ≤ (h− 1)(60) + (k)(ζ)}.
All transactions across the interface are from/to † to/from ‡
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i index of internal offers submitted to † , i = 1, 2, ..., I
j index of internal offers submitted to ‡, j = 1, 2, ..., J
n index of interface offers from † to ‡, n = 1, 2, ..., N
c index of interface offers from ‡ to †, c = 1, 2, ..., C
i˜ index of a modified internal offer at † created fictitiously by CTS,
i˜ = 1, 2, ..., I˜
∗ the superscript that denotes the optimum of an optimization prob-
lem
´ the accent that associates a variable to the ED problem solved
without any utilization of the interface
˜ the accent that associates a variable to the ED problem solved by
the modification of the internal offers at †
˘ the accent that indicates that an offer is cleared
◦ the accent that associates a variable to TLO
a the optimization variable, represents the cleared real power in MW
from an internal offer
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χ the dual variable of the equality constraint of the optimization prob-
lems in the write-up, implies the marginal price to serve an addi-
tional MW of demand
f ` interface exchange
† the bus of IGOA
‡ the bus of IGOB
β = {p, µ} the couplet that represents the offer to sell p MW at µ $/MWh
d † (d ‡) the actual intra-hour demand at † (‡)
d¯ † (d¯ ‡) the forecasted intra-hour demand at † (‡)
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APPENDIX B
TIE-LINE OPTIMIZATION (TLO)
In this appendix, we describe tie-line optimization (TLO) that is deployed for the
interchange evaluation of the two interconnected IGOs. As seen in Chapter 3, the
framework developed in Chapter 2 was a comprehensive and general framework that
can be applied to various interchange evaluation methodologies. In this appendix,
we describe the TLO procedure by using the framework that we developed in Chap-
ter 2. In our description of TLO, we utilize the time scale that we introduced in
Chapter 2.1, and describe the performance of TLO to evaluate the interchange for
the intra-hourly subperiod [k]
∣∣
h
.
In Section B.1, we tailor the framework described in Chapter 2 for TLO. We devote
Section B.2 to the description of TLO. Finally, we present our concluding remarks
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on the appendix in Section B.3.
B.1 The TLO Framework
In Chapter 2, we have presented a general and comprehensive framework that could
be used for the analysis and the performance evaluation of any interchange evalu-
ation methodology, and we have used the framework to represent CTS in Chapter
3. In this section, we tailor the framework in Chapter 2 for TLO and provide the
specific models that get accommodated in the framework.
In order to accommodate the explicit representations of the physical aspects, eco-
nomic aspects, the interactions between the physical and economic aspects, and the
coordination procedure, we have constructed the framework to consist of two inter-
connected layers: the physical layer and the economic layer. The physical layer of the
framework accommodated the power system models and the interface. TLO assumes
the hypothetical aggregation of two interconnected systems, and that the hypotheti-
cally aggregated system is operated by a hypothetical super-IGO that takes over the
functions of both IGOs and so has the knowledge of the offers and the forecasted
intra-hour demands of the two IGOs. Hence, TLO recognizes neither the identities
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nor the independence of the two interconnected IGOs, and treats the interface as an
internal line of the hypothetically aggregated IGO, which renders TLO an infeasible
conceptual construct.
We model the power system of the super-IGO to consist of two busses † and †.
In addition, the power system model of the super-IGO contains the information on
the generators in the aggregated system.
The two busses are physically connected via tie-line(s). There may be one or more
physical tie-lines between the two busses, and the power flows between the two busses
through the tie-line(s). For the purposes of interchange evaluation, we model the tie-
lines as interface. In our model, the interface connects the bus † to the bus †. We
model any power flow from/to † to/from † via the interface. We denote the real
power flow on the interface by f `, and use the convention that if the power flow is
from ‡ to †, then f ` > 0 and if the power flow is from † to ‡, then f ` < 0.
The other layer in the framework constructed in Chapter 2 is the economic layer,
which accommodates all the economic aspects of interchange evaluation and the co-
ordination procedure. We introduce the internal market model, which is the mech-
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anism by which the super-IGO performs the wholesale purchase/sale of electricity
of the aggregated system. We consider that the super-IGO internal market model
has a uniform-price single-sided auction mechanism. The internal intra-hour market
players of the super-IGO sell energy directly to the IGO by submitting sealed inter-
nal offers. Each such internal offer i (j)—where i, i = 1, 2, ..., I—that is submitted
to the bus † is represented by the couplet β †i = {p †i , µ †i}, where p †i is the offered
active power in MW and µ †i $/MWh is the offer price. Similarly, each such internal
offer j—where j, j = 1, 2, ..., J—that is submitted to the bus ‡ is represented by the
couplet β ‡j = {p ‡j, µ ‡j}, where p ‡j is the offered active power in MW and µ ‡j $/MWh
is the offer price.
We represent the set of all internal offers submitted at † (‡) by {β †} ({β ‡}).
In our analysis of the intra-hourly internal markets, we consider the intra-hour de-
mand in the market model of the super-IGO to be price-insensitive. We refer to the
intra-hour demand of each IGO as the residual demand that is not cleared in the
day-ahead market and that needs to be cleared during the intra-hourly subperiod
[k]
∣∣
h
. We represent the intra-hour demand at the bus † (‡) with d † (d ‡). The eco-
nomic layer also accommodates the TLO procedure that the super-IGO executes for
the determination of interchange evaluation.
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The models that are described above get accommodated in their respective layers
of the framework. Namely, super-IGO power system model, and the interface get
accommodated in the physical layer, and the super-IGO internal market model and
the TLO procedure get accommodated in the economic layer. In addition to these
models, it is required to consider the interactions of these models with each other to
execute TLO. The framework accommodates the interactions of these models with
each other through the flow of data/information. We have observed in Chapter 3
that the share of data/information is a critical matter in CTS. However, since in
TLO we assume the hypothetical aggregation of the two systems, we no longer have
the problems associated with the confidentiality of data/information.
B.2 TLO Problem Formulation
The determination of the power flow amount on the interface by the TLO is a by-
product of the solution of an ED problem for the hypothetically aggregated system
using {β †} and {β ‡} to meet the aggregated intra-hour demand d † + d ‡ for a spec-
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ified period. The ED function serves to allocate the submitted internal offers so as
to minimize the payments to serve the aggregated intra-hour demand.
In order to formulate the ED problem, we introduce the variable
◦
a †i (
◦
a ‡j), which
represents the cleared real power in MW from the i th (j th) submitted internal offer.
Hence,
◦
a †i , i = 1, 2, ..., I (
◦
a ‡j, j = 1, 2, ..., J) serve as the optimization variables in
the ED problem formulation.
The TLO problem for the fictitious aggregated system can be formulated as follows:
min
◦
a †i ,
◦
a ‡j
I∑
i=1
(
◦
a †i ) (µ
†
i ) +
J∑
j=1
(
◦
a ‡j ) (µ
‡
j)
s.t.
I∑
i=1
◦
ai +
J∑
j=1
◦
aj − (d¯ † + d¯ ‡) = 0 ←→ ◦χ
◦
ai − pi ≤ 0 i = 1, 2, ...I
◦
aj − pj ≤ 0 j = 1, 2, ...J
(B.1)
The optimal clearance variables
◦
a †i
∗
i = 1, 2, ...I and
◦
a ‡j
∗
indicate the MW of power
cleared from the internal offers i = 1, 2, ...I and j = 1, 2, ...J . Further, we denote
the dual variable associated with the equality constraint at the optimum as
◦
χ
∗
.
◦
χ
∗
is the marginal price to serve the last MW of the aggregated demand d¯ † + d¯ ‡.
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The objective function value obtained with the optimal decision variables corresponds
to the total payments obtained via TLO, which is
∑I
i=1 (
◦
a †i
∗
)(µ †i ) +
∑J
j=1(
◦
a ‡j
∗
)(µ ‡j).
Furthermore, the total amount of power sold by the offerers at † can be represented
by
∑I
i=1
◦
a †i . Similarly, the total amount of power sold by the internal offerers at ‡
can be represented as
∑J
j=1
◦
a ‡j . Therefore, we can write the following equations:
J∑
j=1
◦
a ‡j = d
‡ + f `
I∑
i=1
◦
a †i + f ` = d
†
(B.2)
which will allow us to obtain f ` = 45MW .
B.3 Concluding Remarks and Summary
In this appendix, we have presented the TLO procedure. We have specifically tailored
the framework developed in Chapter 2 for TLO. We have described the condition
that TLO assumes the hypothetical aggregation of the two systems, and that the
hypothetically aggregated system is operated by a super-IGO. We have also provided
the mathematical formulation of TLO, and derived the mathematical expressions
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for the total payments and the interface flow. Since the TLO is an ideal construct
that treats the interface as an internal line of the super-IGO, the total payments
obtained via TLO can be used as a benchmark with which the total payment of
other coordination schemes can be compared.
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